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1. WALID PHARES, FUTURE JIHAD: TERRORIST STRATEGIES AGAINST AMERICA 63 (2005).
Dr. Phares is a professor of Middle Eastern studies and an expert on global terrorism.  He serves
as a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C., and
a Visiting Fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels.  See Short CV of Dr.
Walid A. Phares, http://www.walidphares.com/artman/publish/article_2.shtml (last visited Oct.
17, 2007).  In Future Jihad, Dr. Phares documents the prominent role of Saudi Arabia and its
Wahhabist religious establishment in the creation of the global jihadist.  The work provides
substantial support for the factual record of Saudi Arabia’s role in sustaining the ideological
justification for terror discussed infra Part I.
2. For biographical data regarding the 9/11 terrorists, see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 215-39 (2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].  See also TERRY MCDERMOTT, PERFECT SOLDIERS:
THE 9/11 HIJACKERS (2005).
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SUING ISLAM: TORT, TERRORISM AND THE HOUSE
OF SAUD
DONALD W. GARNER* & ROBERT L. MCFARLAND**
Wahabism produced the religious schools; the religious schools
produced the jihadists.  Among them was Osama bin Laden and the
nineteen perpetrators of September 11.1
Introduction
As the new millennium dawned with the fiery collapse of the World Trade
Center Towers, America awoke to the reality of Islamic terrorism.
In the days following 9/11 many eyes turned to Saudi Arabia after it was
reported that all of the bombers were committed to Wahhabism, Saudi
Arabia’s particular brand of Islam.  Fifteen of the 9/11 jihadists were Saudi
nationals.2  Osama bin Laden was born and schooled in the desert Kingdom
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3. See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 96-97 (2002).
4. See, e.g., id. at 41-43 (describing the connection between Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a
former al Qaeda member involved in the bombing of the 1998 embassy bombings in Sudan, and
the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya, the predecessor to Wahhabism).
5. See, e.g., Frontline: Interview with Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s Former
Ambassador to the United States (PBS television broadcast Oct. 9, 2001), transcript available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/terrorism/interviews/bandar.html.
6. See MADAWI AL-RASHEED, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 16-17 (2002) (introducing
Wahhab as an Islamic reformer who sought to purify Islam); see also MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM
IN THE WORLD 4-5 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining that Wahhab “sought a return to the ‘purity’ of the
original Islam of the Prophet and his companions”).
7. Wahhab’s doctrine of Islamic purity largely rests on the Islamic thought of another
notable figure in Islamic history, Ibn Taymiyya.  See HAMID ALGAR, WAHHABISM: A CRITICAL
ESSAY 8-9 (2002).  Taymiyya was a fourteenth-century reformer who demanded a return to the
explicit commands found in the Qur’an and the Sunna.  He also taught that jihad was obligatory
and there acquired not only his wealth but religious zealotry as well.3  In the
six years since 9/11 many other connections between al Qaeda and Saudi
Arabia’s Wahhabism continue to emerge.4 
Saudi Arabia quickly denied any involvement in or responsibility for 9/11.5
But, notwithstanding the Kingdom’s denials, it is Wahhabist Islam that
sustains al Quada, and it is Saudi Arabia that sustains Wahhabist Islam.  A
close examination of the Kingdom’s historical commitment to the propagation
of Wahhabism, coupled with an appreciation of the intense means and methods
of Wahhabist indoctrination practiced by the House of Saud, allows the
reasonable mind to hold the Kingdom morally and civilly responsible for the
physical consequences of Wahhabist jihad outside of Saudi Arabia’s
geographic borders.  The purpose of this article is to give legal expression to
the Kingdom’s responsibility for acts of Wahhabi terror by articulating a
factual and jurisprudential basis to hold Saudi Arabia civilly liable in tort for
the death and suffering wrought upon America on 9/11.  If the Kingdom’s
liability for 9/11 can be proven, then the murders at Beslan, Bali, London, and
Madrid might also be opened to judicial inquiry where the role of Saudi Arabia
can be considered anew.
Recognition of the Kingdom’s liability begins with an examination of an
eighteenth century Arabian Islamic scholar named Muhammad ibn Abd al
Wahhab.  Wahhab, celebrated to this day in the Kingdom as one of its
founding fathers, is a key figure in the historical development and propagation
of an ultra-orthodox view of Islam justifying violent jihad.  Wahhab devoted
his long life to the creation of a pure and unyielding Islam unencumbered by
the tolerance, free thought, and mercy he believed had polluted it during the
twelve-hundred years following the death of Muhammad.6  Building on a long
line of Islamic thought,7 Wahhab demanded a return to “the pure and authentic
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/1
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and should be recognized as one of the pillars of faith.  See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text.
8. BERNARD LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ISLAM: HOLY WAR AND UNHOLY TERROR 120 (2003).
Wahhab’s followers literally destroyed external manifestations of any faith practiced contrary
to their beliefs.  For example, Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia destroyed domes over buildings in
Mecca “reputed to have been the birthplaces of the Prophet, Khadijat al-Kubra, Imam ‘Ali, and
Abu Bakr al-Siddiq.”  ALGAR, supra note 7, at 27.  Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia have also
destroyed numerous tombs and mausolea in order to carry out Wahhab’s teachings that such
symbols were forbidden by the Prophet.  See id.  In 2001, the Taliban carried on Wahhab’s
tradition of destruction by blowing up the ancient Buddahs of Bayman.  See, e.g., W.L. Rathje,
Why the Taliban Are Destroying Buddhas, USATODAY.COM, Mar. 22, 2001, http://www.
usatoday.com/news/science/archaeology/2001-03-22-afghan-buddhas.htm.
9. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 122.  
The ire of the Wahhabis was directed not primarily against outsiders but against
those whom they saw as betraying and degrading Islam from within . . . .  They
were of course strongly opposed to any school or version of Islam, whether Sunni
or Shi’ite, other than their own.  They were particularly opposed to Sufism,
condemning not only its mysticism and tolerance but also what they saw as the
pagan cults associated with it.
Id.
10. See AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that Wahhab “distinguished himself
by insisting on the importance of monotheism, the denunciation of all forms of mediation
between God and believers, the obligation to pay zakat (Islamic tax to the leader of the Muslim
community), and the obligation to respond to his call for holy war against those who did not
follow these principles” (emphasis added)); see also BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 3, at 41-54
(discussing the historical roots of Wahhab’s teachings); ANIS A. SHORROSH, ISLAM REVEALED:
A CHRISTIAN ARAB’S VIEW OF ISLAM 37 (1988) (noting that the war cry of those heeding
Wahhab’s call to holy war was, “Kill and strangle all infidels which give companions to
Allah”).  The text of Qur’anic suras regarding jihad are provided infra note 43.
11. See AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 16; see also ALGAR, supra note 7, at 34.
The corollary of identifying Muslims other than the Wahhabis as mushrikin
[apostates] was that warfare against them became not simply permissible but
obligatory: their blood could legitimately be shed, their property was forfeit, and
their women and children could be enslaved.  As the events of Karbala and Ta’if
in 1217/1803 made plain, the Wahhabis by no means shrank from the duties of
butchery their doctrine imposed on them.
Id.
Islam of the Founder, removing and where necessary destroying all the later
accretions and distortions.”8  Wahhab allowed no room for diversity or
disagreement in his Islam.9  
Instead, Wahhab insisted that Muslims of pure faith submit to Allah’s will
in everything, including Qur’anic teachings regarding militant jihad.10
Wahhab then declared those who disagreed with his teachings, even his
Muslim neighbors, to be faithless and, therefore, suitable targets for his
purifying jihad.11
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12. See AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 17-18.  See also infra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the immediate rejection of Wahhab’s teachings by his tribe and family.
13. See AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 17-18.  “[T]he Sa’udi ruler agreed to support the
reformer’s demand for jihad, a war against non-Muslims and those Muslims whose Islam did
not conform to the reformer’s teachings.  In return the Sa’udi amir was acknowledged as
political leader of the Muslim community.”  Id. at 18.
14. See id.  Religious fundamentalism, enforced by the jihadist, is the foundation upon
which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is built:
In creating his dynastic state Ibn Saud had followed the time-honoured pattern,
exemplified by his own ancestors, of combining military force with religious
enthusiasm.  The storm-troopers on whom he relied for his victories, known
simply as the Ikhwan (“Brothers”) . . . when not actually fighting,. . . observed a
spartan and puritanical regime closely modeled, as they supposed, on the first
Islamic community established by the Prophet in Madina.  The Ikhwan were
extremely rigid and literalistic in their behaviour: they cut their thaubes (or
gowns) short above the ankles, trimmed their moustaches to a shadow while
letting their beards grow freely, and eschewed the black aghal or rope-ring which
secures the Arab head-dress, all because it was said in certain hadiths (traditions)
that the Holy Prophet was thus attired or trimmed.  Above all, they were utterly
fearless in battle, and brutal as well, having defined themselves as the only true
Muslims in a world of backsliding heretics.
RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 5.
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
2004, S. Prt. No. 108-59, at 589 (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT
REPORT], available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/20429.pdf.  It is a capital
offense for a Christian or Jew to enter the Islamic holy places in Mecca.  See RUTHVEN, supra
note 6, at 12.  Wahhabism is also commonly referred to as Salafism in acknowledgement of the
link between Wahhabism and the Egyptian Salafi movement.  See, e.g., MCDERMOTT, supra
note 2, at 100-01.  Salafism and Wahhabism share a common desire to create an Islamic utopia
where Muslims “revert to the pure Islam of the Prophet Muhammad’s generation and the two
generations that followed his.”  Id. at 101.
Wahhab’s style of fundamental Islam got him kicked out of his tribe and
family, but he thereafter found great favor in the eyes of a local tribal leader
named Muhammad ibn Saud.12  Saud, recognizing the great power inherent in
Wahhab’s message, welcomed him with open arms.  In 1744, Saud’s affinity
for Wahhab was formalized in a historic pact in which Saud adopted Wahhab’s
religious ideology and agreed to protect Wahhab and lead his effort to
indoctrinate the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.13  Armed with Wahhab’s
supreme vision of Islam, the descendants of the House of Saud waged over a
century of internecine war in Arabia.  The Saudi royalty and their Wahhabbi
followers finally subjugated all the neighboring tribal communities and, in
1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was born.14
Throughout the Kingdom’s history, and to this very day, the only religious
belief allowed by the Saudi King is Wahhab’s particular version of Sunni
Islam, now commonly known as Wahhabism.15  The Kingdom employs
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/1
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16. See 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 589.
17. See id. at 594.
18. David Pryce-Jones, Foreword to ROBERT SPENCER, ISLAM UNVEILED: DISTURBING
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORLD’S FASTEST-GROWING FAITH, at xi-xii (2002).  Recently, Dr.
Sleiman Al-‘Eid, head of the Islamic culture department at King Saud University, reasoned that
Saudi women must not be permitted to drive because:
Driving will lead women to leave their homes a lot, whether they need to or not.
In principle, women should stay at home, as everybody knows.
XX. . . .
XXAnother consequence of this will be the diminishing of men’s guardianship
over women.  If a wom[a]n drives, she will have a certain degree of independence,
and she will come and go, travel, and so on.  This will also lead to an increase in
suspicions.  When she has her own car, she will go out and return late.
Saudi Intellectuals Discuss Whether Women Should Be Allowed to Drive (Lebanese
Broadcasting Corp. television broadcast May 19, 2007), transcript available at http://www.
memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/1475.htm.
19. See infra Part I.B.1-3.
20. BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 3, at 96-97.  Bin Laden was stripped of his Saudi
citizenship in 1994.  See NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WAHHABI ISLAM: FROM REVIVAL AND
REFORM TO GLOBAL JIHAD 266 (2004).
21. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 371 (“Saudi Arabia has been a
problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.  At the level of high policy, Saudi Arabia’s
leaders cooperated with American diplomatic initiatives . . . .  At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s
society was a place where al Qaeda raised money . . . [and it] was the society that produced 15
of the 19 hijackers.”).
22. We are not arguing that Saudi Arabia is the only source of Islamic terrorism.  In his
excellent book, Faith at War, Yaroslav Trofimov documents numerous connections between
the current global jihad and numerous Islamic states, including Tunisia, Yemen, Kuwait,
Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Mali.  See YAROSLAV TROFIMOV, FAITH AT WAR (2005).
23. See Kenneth Lasson, Incitement in the Mosques: Testing the Limits of Free Speech and
religious police, the notorious Mutawwa’in, to strictly enforce its Wahhabist
orthodoxy.16  These religious police control the lives of Saudi subjects from
the day’s attire to the manner, timing and substance of the day’s prayer.17  It
is the Saudi religious police that impose the restraints upon women, keeping
them hidden away from much of society.18  The religious authorities do not
stop at controlling the activities of Saudi subjects but also practice vigorous
forms of thought control by regulating educational texts and curriculum,
media, and even the sermons delivered in the country’s Wahhabi mosques.19
It was in Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden received his religious training
and, not surprisingly, learned to hate the West.20  Indeed, it was from the sands
of Saudi Arabia that fifteen of the nineteen suicide bombers sprang on the
morning of September 11, 2001.21  While Saudi Arabia is surely not the only
source of Islamic terrorism,22 it is difficult to ignore the numerous and strong
connections between Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist religious establishment and
the ideology sustaining worldwide Islamic jihad.23  It is now beyond serious
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Religious Liberty, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 20-21 (2005). 
The connection between Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi-inspired terrorism is [ ]
apparent. . . .  
XXThe Saudi regime has engaged in a dangerous devil’s bargain: By supporting
madrasas (religious schools) and mosques, it has been able to deflect attention
from its failed domestic programs.  “In the past [thirty] years Saudi-funded
schools have churned out tens of thousands of half-educated, fanatical Muslims
who view the modern world and non-Muslims with great suspicion.  America, in
this world view, is almost always evil.” 
XXThe Saudis also spend seventy billion dollars funding a Wahhabist, anti-
Western agenda, as well as terror groups around the world.  Nevertheless,
although in July 2002 the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board said “that Saudi
Arabia was an enemy of the United States . . . [and] that the Saudis were active
at every level of the terror chain,” various United States administrations have
adopted a policy of determined non-confrontation with the House of Saud.
Id. (bracketed alterations and second ellipses in original) (footnotes omitted); see also
RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 368 (“The role of Saudi Arabia in fomenting the modern Islamist
movement cannot be underestimated.”).
24. Saudi Arabia’s role in creating the modern jihadist is discussed infra Part I.
25. See, e.g., Rachel Ehrenfeld, The Saudi Connection: Their Oil Is Thicker Than Our
Blood, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, June 1, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ehrenfeld
200406010834.asp.
dispute that the ideology that old king Saud used to conquer Arabia is now
being used by the jihadists to wage religious war against the West.
This article rests upon our belief that a nation that fosters terrorist ideology
should be liable to pay for the damages caused when that ideology seeps
across its borders.  This article lays out the factual and legal predicates for a
viable civil cause of action against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its role
in creating the ideological infrastructure supporting Islamic terrorism. 
It may strike some as ludicrous that Saudi Arabia’s dedication to building
Wahhabism globally should make Saudi Arabia civilly liable for at least some
small part of the harm caused by Wahhabist-inspired terrorists.  But we believe
that, irrespective of the realpolitic need of the White House to accommodate
the House of Saud, the families of those injured by acts of Islamic terrorism
occurring on American soil deserve their day in court.  It does not seem too
much to ask that a small part of the riches of a Kingdom that taught, nurtured,
and filled jihadists with thoughts of eternal rewards24 for acts of murder should
be used to compensate those injured by such jihadists.
The courtroom is an excellent forum for the factfinding necessary to follow
radical Islam’s ideology to its lair.  Saudi Arabia should have no disagreement
with this point in that the Kingdom regularly uses foreign courtrooms to sue
critics of its policies.25  An American courtroom provides due process to all
sides in a calm and deliberate forum.  If it is but a stunning statistical anomaly
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/1
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26. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks to the National Endowment for
Democracy, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1502, 1503 (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2005_presidential_documents&docid
=pd10oc05_txt-15.pdf (describing the war on terrorism as primarily an ideological war against
and enemy with a “clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil but not
insane”). 
27. Before moving on, we note, but do not consider in any depth, the implications of our
“follow the ideology” liability theory as it might be applied to other sponsors of terrorism.
There are other theocratic states, and there are other sponsors of religiously-motivated terrorism
in the world.  We believe the theories of liability discussed in the article may be applicable to
varying degrees in these cases.  Whether California Imam Muzammil Siddiqi, who indoctrinated
the “American al Qaeda” Adam Yahiye Gadahn (nee Pearlman) and brought him into radical
Islam, should be held civilly liable for the violence that his student now promises to bring to the
world is beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Debbie Schlussel, Adam Gadahn’s Extremist
American Imam (May 28, 2004), http://www.debbieschlussel.com/columns/column052804
.shtml.  We do note in passing that such individual liability could not be based on the unique
facts generated by the case against Saudi Arabia for its state-sponsored indoctrination of its
subjects.  Whether individual mullahs, priests or rabbis should bear legal responsibility for any
harm inflicted by their faithful followers heeding the religious call to action is beyond the scope
of this article.  Constitutional concerns for individual freedom of speech and religion, defenses
wholly inapplicable to the case against Saudi Arabia, complicate the question of liability in
individual cases.
that every 9/11 bomber was a committed Wahhabist, then our case is lost.  But
we believe that a civil trial will expose and document our real foe in the
ideological war now confronting us.26
Lawsuits exposing facts regarding the ideological sources of Islamic
terrorism will not only allow compensation of victims but will also inform the
American public and therefore improve public discourse regarding a wide
range of vital issues: foreign policy, energy policy, diplomatic policy, and the
deployment of our military forces around the world.  An adversarial
proceeding conducted in a neutral court of law will produce a sterling public
record preserved for the archives of history.  Our hope is that, at least in some
small way, tort lawsuits will help America thoughtfully defend itself against
Islamic intolerance and violence that is being driven by Wahhabist ideology.27
Part I of this article provides a brief history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and its program of Wahhabist indoctrination and propagation.  This section
also documents the distinctive totalitarian relationship existing between the
Kingdom and its subjects, and provides the factual basis of the tort theories
discussed in Part II.
Part II outlines two independent sources of tort liability resting on these
facts.  First, the Kingdom has created an unreasonable risk of harm by inciting
its subjects to kill in the name of Allah.  We inelegantly label this basis of
liability “negligent incitement of terrorism.”  Second, the Kingdom’s unique
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28. See infra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Donald W. Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269
(1977).
30. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 331 (2001).
31. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 8, at xxxii (explaining that “for many, perhaps most
Muslims, . . . [bin Laden’s] declaration [of jihad on the United States] is an equally grotesque
travesty of the nature of Islam, and even of its doctrine of jihad”).
totalitarian relationship with its subjects generates an independent basis of
negligence liability.  The Second Restatement of Torts and a number of cases
recognize tort responsibility for the actions of third parties if there is a “special
relationship” between the defendant and the third-party actor.  Where a
defendant has some unique authority over a potentially dangerous person and
fails to exercise that authority, the failure to control the danger and prevent the
harm justifies the imposition of civil liability.  Saudi Arabia had a very special
relationship with the 9/11 jihadists and did nothing to stop them.
Part III discusses the central procedural hurdle to the civil lawsuit we
propose: the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.  This defense has thus far
prevented the current set of 9/11 litigants from presenting their case in the
litigation pending in New York federal court.28  We argue that Saudi Arabia
does not enjoy immunity in the particular tort actions we propose in Part II. 
We, of course, recognize that any lawsuit seeking to expose sources of
Islamic fundamentalism will be an especially difficult legal endeavor.  Tort
law rarely focuses on theological indoctrination and the case grows even more
complex when the defendant sponsor of the ideology is a foreign sovereign
nation.  But complexity, difficulty, and novelty do not mean that the case
against Saudi Arabia should not be heard. 
Consider the lessons of the Tobacco Wars.  Thirty years ago, it struck most
observers as crazy that tobacco companies should be held accountable for the
social costs of their deadly products.29  Yet it was through tobacco lawsuits
that the American public came to appreciate the real deceptiveness and
destructiveness of Big Tobacco.30  Only by getting to know the cigarette
industry, via the exposure and documentation of facts in courts of law, was
that industry brought to justice.  Only by getting to know Saudi history and
theology can Islamic terrorism be brought to justice.
I. The Factual Record
It is certainly true that terrorism is incongruous with the faith of many of the
world’s more than one billion Muslims.31  But, given the numerous
connections between Wahhabism and the 9/11 jihadists, it is foolishness to
deny the connection between Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism and terrorism.  We
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/1
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32. See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 3, at 40-41 (“Only by understanding the religious
nature of the attacks of September 11 can we make any sense of their unprecedented scale and
their intended effects.  And only by doing so will we have any chance of understanding the
enemy and arriving at a plan to defeat it . . . .”).
33. Donna Abu-Nasr, We Are Just Instruments of Death, TORONTO STAR, July 31, 2007,
at AA01 (explaining that, according to Iraq’s national security advisor, Saudis make up nearly
half of the foreign jihadists detained in Iraq).
34. Professor Al-Rasheed describes the pact between Saud and Wahhab as follows:
[Wahhab] arrived in Dir’iyyah, forty miles away from ‘Uyaynah, with the hope
of convincing its Saudi amir to adopt his message.  
XX[Wahhab’s] reputation had already reached the small oasis. . . .  According to
acknowledge that Saudi Arabia, as a matter of official Kingdom policy, did not
intend to harm the United States or its other global neighbors.  We do argue,
however, that Saudi Arabia, despite its strategic alliance with the United
States, instilled, through its state-sponsored Wahhabism, a uniquely intolerant
and dangerous version of Islam now resulting in jihad throughout the world.
The princes of the House of Saud may have been surprised that the Kingdom’s
ideology spawned a generation of jihadists, but such naïveté is not a legal
defense.
If the United States is to be victorious in its ideological war on terror it must
confront the true ideological enemy.32  Despite numerous speeches on the
subject of Islamic terrorism, the current administration has barely mentioned
Saudi Arabia.  Instead, the focus of the war on terror has turned to Iraq even
though half of the jihadists detained in Iraq are Saudi nationals.33  As policy-
makers attempt to identify the ideological roots of terror, they should not
ignore centuries of history pointing with surprising clarity directly at the
modern homeland of Mecca and Medina.
This section provides a brief history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
is intended to highlight the facts necessary to establish the liabilities outlined
in Part II of this article.  In order to achieve this purpose we provide a capsule
summary of the Wahhabist ideology propagated by the desert Kingdom.  We
begin the factual record with Wahhab and end it with an outline of Saudi
Arabia’s totalitarian program of Wahhabist indoctrination.
A. Historical Development of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia
Three decades before the American Revolution, the founders of the House
of Saud were making their own revolutionary plans in the Arabian Desert.  The
1744 meeting between Mahammad ibn Saud, the patriarch of the House of
Saud,  and Mullah Wahhab, Saudi Arabia’s spiritual father, cemented a
political and religious relationship that would, over the next one hundred and
fifty years, lead to the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.  The
Saud/Wahhab pact34 dedicated the Saudi Kingdom to spreading and securing
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one source: “Muhammad ibn Sa’ud greeted Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and
said, ‘This oasis is yours, do not fear your enemies.  By the name of God, if all
Najd was summoned to throw you out, we will never agree to expel you.’
Muhammad ibn ‘Adb al-Wahhab replied, ‘You are the settlement’s chief and a
wise man.  I want you to grant me an oath that you will perform jihad (holy war)
against the unbelievers.  In return you will be imam, leader of the Muslim
community and I will be leader in religious matters.’”  According to this narrative,
the Saudi ruler agreed to support [Wahhab’s] demand for jihad, a war against non-
Muslims and those Muslims whose Islam did not conform to [Wahhab’s]
teachings.  In return, the Saudi amir was acknowledged as political leader of the
Muslim community.
AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 17-18.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 15.  At the time of Saud’s emergence, it is unlikely that there were more than
seventy households in Dir’iyyah.  Id.  Saud’s position in Dir’iyyah was a result of several
factors.  First, his family likely founded the desert settlement.  He also possessed great wealth
and land enabling him to finance many local merchants and thereby gain their allegiance.
Additionally, Saud possessed the political and military acumen necessary to rule the settlement.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Wahhab’s family was not wealthy.  But they were well known for their contributions
to Islam.  Several members of his family were Islamic scholars.  Id. at 16.  Wahhab’s father was
also the qadi, or Islamic judge, who was responsible for administering the shari’a in al’-
Uyayna.  Id.
40.  Id.
Wahhab’s vision of Sunni Islam throughout Arabia and also throughout the
world.  Since the date of that historic pact, the House of Saud has been true to
its commitment to Wahhab’s teachings.
Unlike other middle-eastern areas of the time, the interior of the Arabian
Peninsula in the 1700s was not directly controlled by the Ottoman Empire.35
The absence of Ottoman rule allowed local tribal leaders to emerge as the
governing authorities over tribal settlements throughout the region.36  The
progenitor of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Muhammad ibn Saud,
was one of these tribal leaders who ruled a small desert oasis settlement in
central Arabia known as Dir’iyyah.37
Prior to his alliance with Wahhab, Saud’s influence outside his small desert
settlement was very limited and he needed something to enable him to defeat
his regional enemies and thereby extend his rule.38  He found what he was
looking for in the riveting message of the Islamic preacher Wahhab. 
Wahhab was born in 1703 into an influential religious family in eastern
Saudi Arabia.39  This religious heritage led Wahhab to pursue four years of
Islamic training in the holy city of Medina.40  There Wahhab found his calling
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41. Taymiyya was a prolific fourteenth-century Islamic jurist and scholar whose teachings
are frequently cited by modern Islamists.  A recent study published by the Combating Terrorism
Center at the United States Military Academy reveals that Taymiyya is the Islamic scholar most
cited by modern advocates of global jihad.  COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., MILITANT IDEOLOGY
ATLAS 18 (William McCants ed., 2006), available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/Atlas-
ExecutiveReport.pdf.  This reveals the surprising relevance of Taymiyya’s centuries-old
teachings to the modern world.
XXTaymiyya was deeply convinced that Muslims of his day had been corrupted by the
influences of Christianity, Judaism, and paganism.  See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 3, at
46.  He believed this corruption of faith occurred due to the departure of strict obedience to
authoritative Islamic texts.  Accordingly, he called for personal examination of the Qur’an and
the Sunna (the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad) recorded in the Hadith literature
in order to find the true path of Islamic purity.  See JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ISLAMIC LAW 63 (1982).
42. RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 266; see also SCHACHT, supra note 41, at 66.
43. Taymiyya’s hermeneutic commitment to a literal application of the words of Islamic
holy texts led him to his most significant contribution to the modern world, his teachings
regarding jihad.  Taymiyya rejected as apostasy the notion that jihad was an optional or
incidental aspect of a Muslim’s faith.  See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 3, at 49-50. 
Breaking with the authorities of his day, ibn Taymiyya placed jihad on the same
level as the “five pillars” of Islam: prayer, pilgrimage, alms, the declaration of
faith (“There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet”), and the fast
of Ramadan.  Most clerics did not regard participation in jihad as a sine qua non
of piety.  Ibn Taymiyya again returned to scripture: he argued that since prayer
and jihad were such important themes in early, authoritative narratives about
Muhammad, clearly these activities were God’s two essential requirements for all
conscientious, able-bodied Muslims.  The goal of jihad is God’s victory; anyone
who opposes jihad is therefore an enemy of God.
Id.
XXTaymiyya’s teachings rest on methodical application of numerous Qur’anic commands to
wage jihad.  For example, Sura 2:190-93: 
XXFight for the sake of God those that fight against you, but do not attack them
first.  God does not love aggressors.  
XXSlay them wherever you find them.  Drive them out of the places from which
they drove you.  Idolatry is more grievous than bloodshed.
XX. . . .
XXFight against them until idolatry is no more and God’s religion reigns supreme.
AL-QUR’AN 2:190-93 (N.J. Dawood trans., Penguin Books 2003).  And Sura 2:216:
XXFighting is obligatory for you, much as you dislike it.  But you may hate a
thing although it is good for you, and love a thing although it is bad for you.  God
knows, but you [do] not.
Id. at 2:216.  For a collection of other Qur’anic verses commanding jihad, see IBN WARRAQ,
LEAVING ISLAM: APOSTATES SPEAK OUT 414-24 (2003).
in the writings of Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya41 and dedicated his life to
restoring Taymiyya’s militant message of jihad to its full power.42
Wahhab, armed with his understanding of Taymiyya’s teachings regarding
jihad,43 returned to his hometown intending to purify the faith of those living
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XXRelying on these explicit Qur’anic commands, Taymiyya concluded that it was the ordained
duty of every Muslim to fight the enemies of God wherever they be found.  See BENJAMIN &
SIMON, supra note 3, at 50-55.
XXTaymiyya also utilized the pattern and statements of the Prophet as recorded in the Hadith
literature to support his doctrine of jihad.  Professor Bernard Lewis has collected a few samples
of Hadith literature upon which Taymiyya undoubtedly relied to defend this position.  These
are words ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad:
XXJihad is your duty under any ruler, be he godly or wicked.
XXA Day and a night of fighting on the frontier is better than a month of fasting
and prayer.
XXThe nip of an ant hurts a martyr more than the thrust of a weapon, for these are
more welcome to him than sweet, cold water on a hot summer day.
XXHe who dies without having taken part in a campaign dies in a kind of
unbelief.
XXGod marvels at people [those to whom Islam is brought by conquest] who are
dragged to Paradise in chains.
XXLearn to shoot, for the space between the mark and the archer is one of the
gardens of Paradise.
XXParadise is in the shadow of swords.
LEWIS, supra note 8, at 32 (bracketed alteration in original).
XXTaymiyya’s doctrine of jihad also rests on rewards promised to the faithful jihadist: 
Indeed the martyr has seven special favours from Allah: all his sins are forgiven
at the first spurt of his blood, he sees his place in Paradise as his blood is shed
(before his soul leaves the body), he tastes the sweetness of iman (faith), he is
married to seventy-two of the Beautiful Maidens of Paradise, he is protected from
the Punishment of the Grave, he is saved from the Great Terror (on The Day of
Judgment), there is placed upon his head a crown of honour a jewel of which is
better than the whole world and everything in it, and he is granted permission to
intercede for [seventy] members of his household to bring them into Paradise and
save them from the Hell Fire.
RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 407 (emphasis added).
XXTaymiyya’s doctrine of obligatory jihad caught Wahhab’s attention.  And his teachings
regarding jihad remains vital in Wahhabism today.  See COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., supra
note 41, at 15 (noting the frequent citations to Wahhab in modern jihadist propaganda).
44. AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 16; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 267.  Wahhab,
like Taymiyya, demanded a return to the literal words of the Qur’an and the Hadith.  See
ALGAR, supra note 7, at 10 (explaining that the whole purpose of Wahhabism is to “dismantle
the complex and intricate structures of law, theology and mysticism, not to mention religious
practice, that had grown up since the completion of the Qur’anic revelation, and to find a way
back directly to the twin sources of Islam, to the Qur’an and the Sunna [of the Hadith
literature]”).
45. The danger of Wahhab’s ideology was immediately recognized by his contemporaries.
Ahmad bin Zayni Dahlan, the mufti of Mecca in 1871 and one of the spiritual leaders of Islam
in Arabia at the time, described the immediate rejection of Wahhab’s message, including
rejection from the members of Wahhab’s own family:
[Wahhab] began as a student of the religious sciences in al-Madina al-
there.44  Wahhab’s radical message45 was not well received even by his own
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/1
2007] TORT, TERRORISM & THE HOUSE OF SAUD 235
Munawwara, peace and blessings be upon the one dwelling there.  His father was
a righteous scholar, as was his brother, Shaykh Sulayman.  Together with his
teachers, both of them began to suspect that he would give rise to error and
misguidance, on account of various sayings, acts and tendencies they observed in
him.  They reproached him and warned people against him.  God proved their
suspicions to be justified when by way of unjustified innovations (bid’a) he
propagated error and misguidance, leading the ignorant astray in opposition to all
the established leaders in matters of religion (a’immat al-din).  He went so far as
to declare the believers unbelievers. . . .
XXThe [Islamic] scholars wrote numerous treatises in refutation of [] Wahhab;
included among them were his own brother, Shaykh Sulayman, and his teachers.
ALGAR, supra note 7, at 78-80 (emphasis added).
46. The tribal chiefs of Hasa and Najd, the regions where Wahhab began preaching his
message of purification, “resented the reformer and feared the spread of his message.”  AL-
RASHEED, supra note 6, at 17.  These leaders were so concerned about Wahhab’s message that
they ordered his death.  Id.
47. RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 267.  Unlike Wahhab, Taymiyya tolerated varying views
within the Islamic community of faith: “Taymiyya, although opposed to certain aspects of
Sufism in his time which he regarded as erroneous or degenerate, did not reject it in toto; he was
himself an initiate of the Qadiri tariqa [a Sufi organization].”  ALGAR, supra note 7, at 9-10.
48. During his study of Taymiyya’s scholarship, Wahhab developed an “uncompromising
hostility to . . . the contamination of Islam by non-Muslim innovations or practices borrowed
from Christianity or introduced by the Sufi tariqas.”  RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 266; see also
DELONG-BAS, supra note 20, at 8.  “For eighteenth-century reformers, one of the major signs
of the deterioration of Islam was the adoption of rituals and beliefs from other religions, like
praying to saints and believing that saints could grant blessings or perform miracles.”  Id.
49. ALGAR, supra note 7, at 21 (explaining that the Wahhabis declared jihad against other
Muslims who disagreed with Wahhab’s interpretations of the holy texts).  Wahhab’s message
of purification prompted religious battles in Arabia between Wahhabis and their impure Muslim
rivals (non-Wahhabis).  RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 267. 
XXWahhab taught others how to easily identify apostasy.  All one had to do was observe the
external practices of one’s neighbor.  If the neighbor was not living life exactly as Wahhab
taught that it should be lived, then he was an apostate, no matter what he said he believed.  See,
family and tribe.46  Wahhab was sentenced to death by the leaders of his tribe
but he escaped and fled to the protective arms of ibn Saud.
Why did Wahhab’s teachings so provoke his peers?  The answer is found
in Wahhab’s novel extension of the doctrine of jihad.  Taymiyya had taught
that jihad was justified as a matter of self-defense and preservation at a time
when mongols had invaded and were subjugating the Middle East.  Taymiyya
authorized jihad in order to defend the faith from external infidel forces, but
he did not authorize jihad against other Muslims.47
Wahhab did.  Convinced that the real threat to the Islamic community lay
within, Wahhab authorized jihad against those Muslims he identified as
apostates.48  Wahhab taught Muslims to kill Muslims in order to purify the
faith.49
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e.g., RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 267-68 (explaining that the original Wahhabis focused on
external practices such as “banned music, dancing, poetry, silk, gold, all ornaments and jewelry
because of hadiths condemning them”).
50. See ALGAR, supra note 7, at 19-20 (explaining that Saud, utilizing Wahhab’s ordination,
engaged in “a campaign of killing and plunder all across Arabia”).
51. Saud used his status as Imam, granted to him by Wahhab, to declare jihad on
“unbelievers” throughout the Arabian Peninsula.  Saud relied on Wahhab, and the clerics he
trained, to go out before Saud’s army and indoctrinate the people of Arabia.  ALGAR, supra note
7, at 20 (“In 1159/1746, the Wahhabi-Saudi state made a formal proclamation of jihad against
all [those] who did not share their understanding of tauhid, for they counted as non-believers,
guilty of shirk and apostasy.  It is significant that whenever the term ‘Muslims’ occurs in [Saudi
history] it refers exclusively to the Wahhabis.”).  Wahhabi clerics demanded that true Muslims
“swear allegiance to its religio-political leadership and demonstrate their loyalt[ies] by agreeing
to fight for its cause and pay zakat to its representatives.”  AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 19.
Those who rejected Saud’s authority were severely punished or killed.  “Preaching and raids
progressed simultaneously.”  Id.  This pattern of religious indoctrination and violence
intensified during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as Wahhabist clerics moved rapidly to
destroy opposition to Saudi authority and establish the sovereignty of the Saudi King.  Id. at 50-
52.
52. Wahhab’s doctrine of jihad and his willingness to declare neighboring Muslims infidels
“impregnated the Sa’udi leadership with a new force, which proved to be crucial for the
consolidation and expansion of Sa’udi rule.  Wahhabism promised [the House of Saud] clear
benefits in the form of political and religious authority [as well as] material rewards, without
which the conquest of Arabia would not have been possible.”  AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at
19.
53. The Ottoman Empire was the dominant power on the Arabian Peninsula from the
sixteenth century until its decline in the twentieth century.  See id. at 14-38.
54. See ALGAR, supra note 7, at 42 (“Nor was the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia a peaceful affair.  The second Wahhabi-Saudi conquest of the peninsula came at a cost
of some 400,000 killed and wounded. . . .  The governors of the various provinces . . . are said
to have carried out 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations in the course of subduing
the peninsula.”).
55. Id. at 39. 
The old Saud recognized the power in Wahhab’s message and used it
ruthlessly.50  Saud and his descendants, supported by the preaching of their
Wahhabi clerics, indoctrinated and subjugated51 the Arabian peninsula
utilizing Wahhab’s vision of jihad to unite once separate tribes under the rule
of the House of Saud.52
For a time the Ottomans held Saud and the Wahhabis in check.  However,
the weakness of the Empire and its collapse following World War I provided
new opportunities for the heirs of the Saud/Wahhab pact.53  In 1932, after
nearly thirty years of renewed religious war,54 Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman
Al Saud, a direct descendent of Ibn Saud, became the first monarch of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.55  The tribes of Arabia were then formally united
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56. Id. at 49-62 (describing the process of indoctrination and force used to establish the
Saudi Kingdom).  A key component in the initial program of indoctrination was the elimination
of all divergent religious viewpoints among the ‘ulama (group of men educated in Islam).
While the religious leaders in the Arabian ‘ulama initially had “unhesitatingly rejected the
doctrines of Wahhabism; now they were compelled to submit.”  Id. at 27.  The Kingdom as a
political entity “was simply the political and the military arm of the Wahhabi sect.”  Id. at 19.
XXThe Saudi ruler was initially granted the title Imam by Wahhab himself.  See id. at 17-18.
The Imam is the leader of the umma, the Muslim community.  The Imam, as the political leader
of the umma, is responsible for conducting jihad.  Id.  The legitimacy of the House of Saud’s
continued rule in Saudi Arabia rests on the blessings from the Wahhabist clerics in the ‘ulama.
Id. at 50.
57. See Rod Nordland & Babak Dehghanpisheh, Surge of Suicide Bombers, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 13, 2007, at 30; see also Abu-Nasr, supra note 33, at AA01 (explaining that, according to
Iraq’s national security advisor, Saudis make up nearly half of the foreign jihadists detained in
Iraq).
58. Stephen Schwartz, The Real Saudi Arabia, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2003, at A16.
under their Saudi King and Wahhabi-inspired forces killed any apostate
refusing to recognize Saud as their king.56
B. Continuing Wahhabist Indoctrination in Saudi Arabia
From 1932 to 9/11 the heirs to the Saud/Wahhab pact maintained their
absolute fidelity to Wahhabist principles.  During this period the Saudi crown,
in league with the Wahhabist clerics, force fed jihad to young Saudis.  Saudi
Arabia’s role in creating and inspiring jihadists continues.  In the spring of
2007, a U.S. advisor in Baghdad summed up the point we make in this article:
“Saudi Arabia is the engine of Jihad.”57
Many other observers who possess great knowledge and sophistication
concerning Islam recognize that Saudi Arabia has provided the ideology
sustaining terror.  For instance, the Islamic Sufi (mystic) Steven Swartz reports
that: 
The state religious dispensation, the Wahhabi sect of Islam,
preaches violence against non-Wahhabi Muslims, Christians, Jews,
Hindus, and others.  Throughout the Iraq war, Wahhabi preachers
spewed forth anti-American vitriol.  Saudi fanatics went north to
die fighting the Western infidels — some directed the Ansar ul-
Islam terrorist group that was destroyed in Iraqi Kurdistan by our
troops.  And Saudis incited people in the town of Falluja, where
Sunnis were stirred to rise up and die confronting our forces.58
Senator Charles Schumer, who, like many in New York on 9/11, had a real
introduction to Wahhabism in practice, believes that Saudi Arabia is the
fountainhead of the world’s Islamic terrorism: “[M]ore than just about
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59. Editorial, For the Senate: Schumer, N.Y. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at 28.
60. See RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 368.  Professor Algar discusses the effectiveness of the
Saudi program of indoctrination:
But the Wahhabi dismissal of all Muslims other than themselves as non-believers
is of more than historical significance.  Discreetly concealed over the years
because of a variety of factors — above all the desire of the Saudi regime to
portray itself as a protector of Muslim interests, despite abundant evidence to the
contrary — this attitude of monopolistic rejection continues to inform the attitudes
to[wards] Muslims held by contemporary Wahhabis and those under their
influence, even when not fully articulated.
ALGAR, supra note 7, at 20.
61. See RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 368 (describing the historic program of indoctrination
in Saudi Arabia in which the Wahhabis used the media, police power, schools and government
to transfer “an exclusivist and puritanical mentality that anathematized Shiites, Christians and
non-Salafist groups such as the Barelwis and other Sufi-oriented traditions”); see also ALGAR,
supra note 7, at 27-28 (describing the indoctrination of the Arabian people accompanying
formation of the Saudi state).
62. RUTHVEN, supra note 6, at 368.
63. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 593.
64. Id.
65. See ARNON GROISS, CTR. FOR MONITORING THE IMPACT OF PEACE & AM. JEWISH
COMM., THE WEST, CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN SAUDI ARABIAN SCHOOLBOOKS (2003), available
at http://www.ajcarchives.org/main.php?GroupingId=4070.  Indeed, one of the texts still used
in the ninth grade curriculum in Saudi schools is a book entitled Monotheism authored by
Wahhab centuries ago.  See Saudi Intellectuals Discuss Saudi Curricula (Lebanese
Broadcasting Corp. television broadcast Nov. 5, 2006), transcript available at http://www.
memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP139006.
66. Id.
anything else, the root cause of terrorism is the Saudi propagation of
Wahhabism.”59  From the formation of the Saudi Kingdom to the present,
Saudi Arabia has actively indoctrinated the Saudi population with Wahhab’s
message of jihad and religious intolerance.60  As detailed below, the Saudi
government used, and continues to use, schools, media, and mosques to
indoctrinate its subjects.61  As a result, “[t]he role of Saudi Arabia in fomenting
the modern Islamist movement cannot be underestimated.”62  
1. Indoctrination in Saudi Schools
Saudi Arabia’s government controls and regulates all education, public and
private, in the country.  The Saudi educational program is mandatory and
explicit — only Sunni Wahhabism can be taught in Saudi schools.63  Private
schools with alternative curriculum are forbidden.64  The Saudi Ministry of
Education publishes authorized textbooks, all of which propagate the teachings
of Wahhab.65  Any books authored by non-Wahhabi educators are banned.66
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67. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 108TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 2003, at 546 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT],
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/108/91075e.pdf.  Under Saudi
Arabian law, all children of male citizens are Muslim.  Therefore, children who have been taken
from non-Muslim countries by their Muslim fathers and brought to Saudi Arabia are coerced
to conform to Islam.  Id.  
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Y. Admon, Saudis Criticize Their School Curricula — Again (Feb. 7, 2007), http://
memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=IA32507.
71. Id.
72. Steven Stalinsky, Preliminary Overview — Saudi Arabia’s Education System (Dec. 20,
2002), http://www.memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SR01202.
73. Sheikh Saleh Al-Fawzan is a member of the Senior Council of Clerics, the Council of
Religious Edicts and Research, the Imam of Prince Mitaeb Mosque in Riyadh, and a professor
at Imam Mohamed Bin Saud Islamic University.  See Daniel Pipes, Saudi Religious Leader
Calls for Slavery’s Legalization (Nov. 7, 2003), http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/123.  Al-
Fawzan is on record as supporting both jihad and slavery as part of Islamic law.  Id.  He is also
a leading opponent of changing the Saudi school curriculum and has stated that “[s]lavery is a
part of Islam.  Slavery is part of jihad.”  Id. 
This follows from the unique belief that all children are born Muslim and,
thus, it is a small step to deny families the freedom to choose their children’s
religion.67  Indeed, Saudi children, irrespective of their religion or that of their
parents, are “coerced to conform to Islamic norms and practices, although
forcible conversion is prohibited.”68  The Saudi educational system reinforces
“a deeply conservative and devout Muslim society, [where] there is intense
pressure to conform to societal norms."69  
The Saudi Education Ministry has adopted as official government policy the
following educational goal: “to prepare students physically and mentally for
jihad for the sake of Allah.”70  Another stated goal of the Saudi educational
system is “to arouse the spirit of Islamic jihad in order to fight our enemies, to
restore our rights and our glory, and to fulfill the mission of Islam.”71  Thus
Saudi textbooks expound the obligation to wage continuous religious war.72
Sheik Saleh Al-Fawzan, a member of the highest rank in Saudi society and a
believer in both jihad and slavery in the service of Islam, wrote many of the
textbooks used in Saudi Arabian schools.73
Wahhibist indoctrination in Saudi schools is comprehensive.
The royal family has [ ] given the clergy a lot of control over
education.  Hours are spent studying the official religion at the
expense of other subjects.  The curriculum endorses the exclusivity
of their brand of faith.  A high school text book warns of the dangers
of having Christian and Jewish friends.  It reads, “It is compulsory
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74. Frontline: Saudi Time Bomb? (PBS television broadcast Nov. 15, 2001), transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/script.html.
75. See GROISS, supra note 65, at 3-6; see also PBS Frontline: Religious Textbooks, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/etc/textbooks.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2007).
76. See GROISS, supra note 65, at 92.
77. Id. at 67.
78. Id. at 106.
79. Id. at 153 (alteration in original).
80. Id. at 154.
81. Id. at 153.
82. Id. at 154.
83. See, e.g., id. at 10.
for Muslims to be loyal to each other and consider the infidels their
enemy.”74
Religious hatred is actively promoted in the Saudi educational curriculum.75  A
few statements from Saudi grammar school textbooks make the point:
The Jews are wickedness in its very essence.76
There is no doubt that Muslims’ power irritates the infidels and
spreads envy in the hearts of the enemies of Islam — Christians,
Jews and others — so, they plot against them, gather . . . force[s]
against them, harass them and seize every opportunity in order to
eliminate the Muslims.77
Many of [New York’s] inhabitants are Jews who help strengthen
the Israeli occupation of the land of Palestine.78
Not only are Saudi students exposed to this religious hatred, but they are
instructed to heed the Wahhabi call to jihad as well. 
God in His mercy has legislated many ways for guarding
religion.  Among them are . . . [k]illing apostates and heretics [and]
[j]ihad in the cause of God by soul and property.79
Jihad against the enemies is a religious duty.80
Jihad in God’s cause is the path to victory and to strength in this
world, as well as to attaining Paradise in the hereafter.81
There are two happy endings for jihad fighters in God’s cause:
victory or martyrdom.82
Saudi Arabia now asserts that it is in the process of reforming its educational
curriculum.83  Many question their progress.  On October 26, 2005, United
States Representative Jim Davis, along with forty-eight co-sponsors, introduced
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84. See H.R. Con. Res. 275, 109th Cong. (2005).
85. Id.
86. 151 CONG. REC. H12,187 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2005) (statement of Rep. Lantos),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2005_record&page=
H12187&position=all.
87. Id. (statement of Rep. Davis).  H.R. Con. Res. 275 was referred to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in January of 2006.  See THOMAS (Library of Congress),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ z?d109:h.con.res.00275: (last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
88. Stalinsky, supra note 72.
89. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 546.
House Resolution 275, “Expressing Sense of Congress Regarding Education
Curriculum in Saudi Arabia.”84  House Resolution 275 “urges the Government
of Saudi Arabia to reform its textbooks and education curriculum” and
“expresses extreme disappointment with the slow pace of education reform in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”85  The resolution also urges the President and
State Department to more aggressively pursue education reform in Saudi
Arabia.  Representative Lantos, standing in support of the resolution, noted that
Saudi Arabia has thus far failed to reform its curriculum: “The extremist
Wahhabi religious education which is present in Saudi schools encourages and
promotes extremism, viciously anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic
attitudes. . . .  The vile hatred filling the minds of so many young Saudis in
schools makes them prime targets for terrorists and other extremist groups.”86
Representative Davis, in support of his resolution, explains that the Wahhabi
indoctrination occurring in the Saudi classroom “is, in fact, one of the root
causes of terrorism.  It is the creation of extremism and extremists in the schools
of Saudi Arabia in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”87
2. Indoctrination in Saudi Mosques
The message of hatred and religious intolerance learned in the classroom is
reinforced in Saudi Wahhibist mosques.  For example, in the Suleiman Bin
Muqiran mosque in Riyadh, Sheikh Majed Abd Al-Rahman Al-Firian
demanded that Muslims “educate their children to Jihad.  This is the greatest
benefit of the situation: educating the children to Jihad and to hatred of the
Jews, the Christians, and the infidels; educating the children to Jihad and to
revival of the embers of Jihad in their souls.”88
The U.S. State Department, in a 2003 Report condemning Saudi religious
intolerance, notes that Mosque preachers, all of whom are paid and supervised
by the state, continued their frequent use of violent anti-Jewish and anti-
Christian preaching after 9/11.89  Even after the 2003 Riyadh bombing by al
Qaeda, mosque speakers “have prayed for the death of Jews and Christians,
including from the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in
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90. Id.
91. See Nordland & Dehghanpisheh, supra note 57, at 32.




95. Id. (alterations in original).
96. Id. (first and second alterations in original).
Medina.”90
The effects of this teaching recently moved a Saudi Crown Prince to publicly
chastize a group of imams: “Do you know that your sons who go to Iraq are
used only for blowing themselves up? . . .  Are you happy for your children to
become instruments of murder?”91
3. Indoctrination in Saudi Media
In addition to the schoolhouse and pulpit teachings, Saudi-controlled media
participate in the systematic propagation of Wahhabism on behalf of the Saudi
government.  Wahhibist clerics initially resisted the innovation known as
television.  After overcoming their aversion to this new medium, the Saudi
religious establishment took control of three major television channels: TV1,
TV2 and Iraqa TV.92  These stations now participate in the systematic
indoctrination of the call to Islamic violence.  For example, Sheik Abdallah Al-
Muslih, chairman of the Saudi Commission on Scientific Signs in the Koran
and Sunnah of the Muslim World League, appeared on Iraqa TV on May 20,
2004, and proclaimed: 
Regarding a person who blows himself up . . . .  There is nothing
wrong with [martyrdom] if they cause great damage to the enemy.
We can say that if it causes great damage to the enemy, this
operation is a good thing.93
On State-controlled television, even after the Riyadh bombing and the small
steps that the state made to rein in the most hateful of imams, a learned
discussion could be found on May 24, 2004.94  On that day, Sheik Dr. Ahmad
Abd Al-Latif, who is a professor at Um Al-Qura University, appeared and was
asked: “Some imams and preachers call for Allah to annihilate the Jews and
those who help them, and the Christians and those who support them . . . .  Is
it permitted according to Islamic law?”95  Dr. Al-Latif answered: “What made
them curse the Jews is that the Jews are oppressors . . .  The same goes for
Christians, because of their cruel aggression against Islamic countries . . . [their]
goal is to harm Muslims.  Cursing the . . . Jews and . . . Christians . . . is
permitted.”96  The Saudis have been very successful in their goal of
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97. GROISS, supra note 65, at 33.
98.  Id. at 37 (bracketed alteration in original).
99. See TROFIMOV, supra note 22, at 9; see also ALGAR, supra note 7, at 44, 46-48
(describing the association of Egyptian Salafism and Wahhabism resulting from “broad
propagation of Wahhabism fuelled by petrodollars”).
100. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 128.
101. See Doug Bandow, Befriending Saudi Princes: A High Price for a Dubious Alliance,
POL’Y ANALYSIS, Mar. 20, 2007, at 5-6, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa428.pdf.
102. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html; see also AL-RASHEED,
supra note 6, at 87-89 (describing the King’s complete executive and legislative control over the
Kingdom). 
XX“The royal family dominates all political life in the country to an extent that has few
parallels in the contemporary world.”  Graham Fuller & Thomas S. Szayna, The Saudi Arabian
Prospective Case, in IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL ETHNIC CONFLICT 239, 241 (Thomas S. Szayna
ed., 2000).  Reforms intended to appear democratic were enacted by the Saudi King over the
past few years in response to growing public criticism and pressure from the West.  See AL-
RASHEED, supra note 6, at 87-89.  However, these reforms actually resulted in the consolidation
of the King’s power in the country.  See id.  This council “has an advisory function and can be
dismissed at will [by the King].”  Fuller & Szayna, supra, at 242.
XXFor a recent description of the ongoing failures of Saudi democratic reforms, see Hassan M.
Fattah, After First Steps, Saudi Reform Efforts Stall, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 27, 2007, at 2
(explaining that the recently elected municipal councils are heavily regulated by the Saudi
crown, lack power to enact binding legislation, act largely in secret, and do not adequately
represent the interests of Saudi citizens).
103. See AL-RASHEED, supra note 6, at 126.
“[i]mplanting Islamic principles in the pupil’s soul,”97 and seeing that “Islamic
viewpoints . . . are placed by the State above its [other] goals.”98  
Saudi Arabia’s indoctrination does not stop at its borders.  The Saudi
religious establishment spends billions of dollars every year to propagate this
ideology “quite successfully” throughout the world.99  Using its “petrodollars,”
Saudi Arabia has worked to spread its version of Islam around the world.
Wahhabist indoctrination occurs throughout the world in Saudi-sponsored
“private schools, religious seminars, mosque schools, holiday camps and,
increasingly, prisons.”100  Some of these institutions are al Qaeda’s minor-
leagues, preparing youngsters for the true path of Allah.101
4. The Totalitarian Saudi State
The message taught in Saudi schools, mosques, and media is significantly
amplified by virtue of the fact that Saudi Arabia allows no competing voices.
It is a totalitarian state unfettered by any democratic voice or organ of
government.102  The Saudi King, a member of the patriarchal House of Saud,
“mediate[s] the existence” of Saudi subjects and his rule “penetrates all aspects
of economic and social life.”103  The Kingdom even bears the patriarchal name
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104. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 542.  
[T]here was a greater degree of public discussion of the conservative religious
traditions than previously seen.  Particularly after the May 12 terror attacks in
Riyadh, some citizen writers began to criticize abuses committed by the religious
police (the Committee to Promote Virtue and Prevent Vice, commonly called the
“Mutawwa’in”).  However, discussion of religious issues is severely constrained,
and the editor of a major local daily newspaper was fired from his position after
he allowed the publication of a series of articles and cartoons critical of the
religious establishment.
Id.
105. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 593.
106. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 543-45.  Apostasy is the
conversion by a Muslim to another religion.  Apostates are subject to death sentences if they do
not recant.  Id. at 543.
107. See 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 591.
108. The Kingdom justifies its very existence with these words attributed to the Prophet:
“Let there not be two religions in Arabia.”  LEWIS, supra note 8, at xxix.  Islam’s first Caliph
initiated execution of this command by ordering the expulsion of Jews and Christians from
Arabia.  Id.  But the House of Saud brought the command to its fruition.
According to the school of Islamic jurisprudence accepted by the Saudi state and
by Usama bin Laden and his followers, for a non-Muslim even to set foot on the
sacred soil is a major offense.  In the rest of the Kingdom, non-Muslims, while
admitted as temporary visitors, [are] not permitted to establish residence or
practice their religions.”
Id. at xxx; see also, TROFIMOV, supra note 22, at 8 (“Freedom of religion, in the concise words
of the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights report, ‘does not exist’ in Saudi Arabia.”).
of its ruling family, an appropriate symbol of the House of Saud’s ownership
of the Kingdom and its people. 
Basic freedoms are not recognized in Saudi Arabia.  Freedom of press does
not exist.  Thus, even in the face of the May 2003 Riyadh bombings, there
appeared no criticism of the intolerance of Wahhabism which inspired the
attacks.104  A Saudi journalist was recently sentenced to lashings for writing a
New York Times editorial criticizing the Saudi religious establishment.105  This
lashing was mild compared to other available penalties frequently employed by
the Saudi crown, including death.106
There is no freedom of thought in the Kingdom.  The Kingdom vigorously
enforces its commitment to Wahhabism by preventing its citizens from
converting.  Recently a Saudi schoolteacher was tried for apostasy (non-
conformance to Wahhabist doctrine) and was found guilty.  But she was shown
mercy by receiving the light sentence of three years imprisonment and three
hundred lashes.107
There is also no freedom of religious expression allowed to non-Muslims
present in the Kingdom.108  Wahhabist Saudi Arabia not only excludes other
religions, it violently opposes them.  Christians, Jews, and Hindus are
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109. See 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 543.
110. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 593-94. 
111. Id.
112. Id. at 594.
113. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 545.
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id.  Although twenty-three of the Christians were released, one Sudanese and two Sri
Lankans were kept in detention and moved to another Riyadh prison.  When these three
prisoners were released, the two Sri Lankans were deported and the Sudanese national was
resettled in the United States.  Id.
117. Id.  
118. Id. at 544-46.
119. Id. at 544.
120. Id. at 543.
121. Id.
122. Id.  These legal resident identity cards, called Iqamas, contain a religious designation
for “Muslim” or “non-Muslim.”  Id.
imprisoned, lashed, deported, and “sometimes torture[d].”109  Brian O’Connor,
an Indian Christian, is a case in point.110  After he had a dispute with his
employer, the Saudi religious police arrested him, beat him, and confiscated
two Bibles along with other personal property.111  To cover this abuse, the
Mutawwa’in accused him of using alcohol.112  In a previous State Department
Report, the fate of two Filipino Christians was made known.113  They were
conducting a private Roman Catholic prayer group in their home; they were
imprisoned in Dammam, sentenced to 150 lashes, and deported following a
thirty-day jail sentence.114  In a raid on two private houses where services were
being held, twenty-six Christians were arrested in downtown Riyadh.115  After
a few days most were released, but three were imprisoned,116 and all Bibles,
chairs, microphones, and musical instruments were taken — even the curtains
ripped from the walls.117
There are ongoing reports of surveillance of Christian religious services by
security personnel, and there are many other reports of deportations and
beatings.118  Needless to say, mail is monitored and Bibles are confiscated.119
No Christian ministers are allowed to enter the country, even to administer the
sacraments.120  While distributing Bibles is illegal, there are aggressive means
taken to convert all people to Islam by the five hundred persons who work in
about fifty “Call and Guidance Centers” located throughout the country.121
Special identity cards are required for different religions.122
The official government policy of brutalizing Christians is backed up by an
active campaign of vigilantes, who have “harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested,
and detained citizens and foreigners” for supposedly practicing their religious
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123.  Id. at 546.
124. The Grand Mufti is the religious leader.  See 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra
note 15, at 116 (describing a mufti as “an Islamic leader”).  
125. Id. at 594.
126. Id. at 594-95.
127. Id.
128. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 541-44.  Approximately two
million citizens are Shi’ite Muslims.  The majority of Shi’a live in the eastern province, where
they make up about one-half of the population there.  Id. at 541; see also, ALGAR, supra note
7, at 11-14 (explaining that Wahhab’s teachings were mainly concerned with condemnation of
Muslims he considered to be apostates).
129. See ALGAR, supra note 7, at 42.  The Saudis were especially harsh in dealing with the
Shi’a population, “executing thousands of people and decimating both the religious and tribal
leadership of the Shi’i community.”  Id. at 42-43.
130. See, e.g., TROFIMOV, supra note 22, at 34-38.  In a recent essay commenting on the
treatment of Shi’ite faithful in Saudi Arabia, Tarek Heggy writes: 
XXIf I were a Shi’ite from Saudi Arabia, I would familiarize the world with the
injustices done to many Saudi Shi’ites since the establishment of the Saudi
Kingdom in 1932 and since the Wahhabis took control of the Arabian Peninsula.
. . .  
XX. . . .
XXIf I were a Shi’ite from Saudi Arabia, I would make the world understand that
the issue of the Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia is one of the symptoms of a [certain]
mentality whose influence has spread through this region of the world, and that
convictions.123  To make sure the message that Christians are worthless and
dangerous is not forgotten, shops are prohibited from selling anything to do
with Christmas, including tree decorations or gifts.  And Valentine’s Day has
been outlawed by the Grand Mufti,124 as a “pagan Christian holiday.”125
The Wahhabi cry for jihad has been answered by al Qaeda in both the
Kingdom and beyond.126  In the attack in Riyadh on a Western housing
compound in al–Khobar in 2004, terrorists singled out non-Muslims for
execution and justified their murder on religious grounds.127  It was in this
environment of religious persecution that Osama bin Laden was born and
raised.  Is it any wonder that he now feels no pity for the thousands of
individuals murdered by his command?
The Kingdom not only forbids the religious freedom of non-Muslims, it also
oppresses Muslims who do not adhere to Wahhab’s Islam.128  Saudi Arabia’s
most notorious acts of religious violence have been directed at fellow Muslims.
More than 40,000 public executions and 350,000 public amputations have been
carried out by Saudi Wahhabists in their effort to “purify” the Islamic
community of the Arabian Peninsula from wrong-believing Muslims.129  To this
day Shi’a Muslims living in eastern Saudi Arabia and members of the Ismaili
sect of Islam in southern Saudi Arabia hide their true faith in order to avoid
religious persecution.130  Despite the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, the State
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all humanity must force [those with] this mentality to reconsider this
discriminatory path.”
Egyptian Intellectual Tarek Heggy: ‘If I Were a Shi’ite from Saudi Arabia . . .’ (June 15, 2007),
http://www.memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP162307.
131. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 596. 
132. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 74, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/217%20(III).
133. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 589-96. 
134. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 543.  These examples of
persecution are highlighted in the State Department Report:  In January 2002, the Wall Street
Journal published Sheikh Ahmed Turki al-Saab’s comments that were very critical of Saudi
Arabia’s policies toward the Shi’ites.  One week later, he was arrested, and in April 2002, he
was sentenced to flogging and seven years in prison.  Id. at 545.  In that same year, there were
reports of fourteen Christians deported for spreading their religious beliefs.  Id.  In May 2002,
the Mutawwa’in in Jeddah arrested eleven Christians, including foreign nationals from both
Ethiopia and Eritrea, for allegedly engaging in activities that violated restrictions against public
worship.  All eleven were later deported.  Id.  At the beginning of 2003, the Mutawwa’in
arrested and imprisoned four emigrant Protestants without charge.  Two of them were later
released and deported, but it is believed that at least one is still imprisoned.  Id.
135. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 589.  The Government detains
Shi’a religious leaders and members of the Ismaili Shi’a community in Najran province.  2003
STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 541.  The Shi’a members still face political and
economic discrimination, “including limited employment opportunities, little representation in
official institutions, and restrictions on the practice of their faith and on the building of mosques
and community centers.”  Id.  Shi’ite admission to universities is severely restricted, and
members of the Shi’a are discriminated against in public employment and lack representation
in government agencies.  2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 592.
Department finally recognized Saudi Arabia as a religiously intolerant country
and, in its 2003 report denoted the Kingdom a “Country of Particular
Concern.”131
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, endorsed by Saudi
Arabia via its participation in the United Nations, declares that, “Everyone has
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”132  But Saudi Arabia
refuses to actually comply with this Declaration and shows its intolerance to
non-Wahhabism in every facet of government and society.133  Recent State
Department Reports are replete with examples of extreme religious persecution
including imprisonment, lashing, torture, and expulsion of the infidel.134  Shi’a
leaders are detained, and the members are discriminated against in all fields.135
The Saudi crown says it respects the right to worship in private.  But that
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136. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 589.
137. Id. at 590.  The foreign population includes approximately 1.4 million Indians, 1
million Bangladeshis, 900,000 Pakistanis, 800,000 Filipinos, 750,000 Egyptians, 250,000
Palestinians, 150,000 Lebanese, 130,000 Sri Lankans, 40,000 Eritreans, and 30,000 Americans.
Id.
138. 2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 541.
139. 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 590-91.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 592.  The Saudi religious police also prohibit the observance of the Prophet’s
birthday because such observance is considered idol worship.  Id. at 591.
concession is often violated.136  The Saudi population is approximately twenty-
four million, with about six to seven million foreigners.137  Among these
foreigners are between 500,000 and one million Catholics.138  These people live
and work in Saudi Arabia but they are confronted with de jure discrimination
at every turn.  For instance, under Saudi law, Shari’a, tort damages for a Jew or
Christian are one-half that of a Muslim.139  For polytheistic Hindus and Sikhs
they get but one-sixteenth of the damages available to Muslims.140  And the
testimony of non-Sunnis in court is often ignored.141
All of this demonstrates that, when all of Saudi Arabia’s available state
power is devoted to justifying, promoting, and enforcing religious intolerance,
it is not surprising that someone might be listening.  When the reality of living
under a Saudi theocratic dictatorship is combined with the Wahhabi call for
martyrdom, it is little wonder that it was Saudi Arabian subjects and not citizens
of Finland who murdered the infidels working in the World Trade Center.
II. Saudi Arabia’s Civil Liability
This section outlines Saudi Arabia’s civil liability that we see as resting on
ordinary principles of negligence tort law.  Our point is simple, Saudi Arabia
should reap what it has sown.  
We recognize that the facts are extremely unusual.  But developed and
reasoned personal injury law is flexible and powerful enough to give the
victims of Saudi inspired terrorism their day in court. 
We are not arguing that Saudi Arabia intended any harm to the United States
or its citizens.  Saudi Arabia’s link to 9/11 is not like Libya’s link to the
bombing of Pan-Am Flight 103.  Unlike Libya, we are not arguing that Saudi
Arabia organized, commanded, or executed any act of state-sponsored
terrorism.  Our point is not that Saudi Arabia committed an intentional tort, but
it was negligent.
Saudi Arabia should have foreseen the harm it was inspiring by its relentless
teaching of Wahhabism.  Saudi Arabia should have foreseen that its brutal
support of Sunni Wahhabism gave radical elements of that faith an exclusive
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142. See discussion infra Part III.A.
143. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
144. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
145. The district court in the 9/11 litigation said as much: “Rather than pleading specific
facts showing that the Kingdom caused Plaintiffs’ injuries, the . . . Plaintiffs focus
predominantly on the [Saudi-supported] charities’ actions.”  In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11,
2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 803 n.31 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
146. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 54 (“Yet as political, social, and
economic problems created flammable societies, Bin Laden used Islam’s most extreme,
fundamentalist traditions as his match.”); see also, e.g., Bush, supra note 26, at 1505 (“The
murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals is the great challenge of our new century.”).
XXSaudi Arabia, according to a report submitted to the President of the United Nations Security
Council, has played a significant role in terrorism financing.  According to the report:
By mixing religious beliefs, tools and interpretations with financial purposes,
without proper regulations and controls, Saudi Arabia opened an avenue for
terrorism financing through the traditional Zakat, a legal almsgiving conceived as
a way for purification by the Prophet that turned into a financial tool for terrorists.
JEAN-CHARLES BRISARD, TERRORISM FINANCING: ROOTS AND TRENDS OF SAUDI TERRORISM
FINANCING 3 (2002), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/document/document-un1
22002.pdf.  We are not arguing that Saudi Arabia’s role in terrorism financing should be
ignored.  Instead, we propose tort liability resulting from much more than mere contributions
to charitable organizations somewhat removed from al Qaeda.  
147. 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
and uncontested ideological pulpit from which they could incite others to
action.  Saudi Arabia’s failure to prevent their state-paid religious clerics from
igniting a worldwide jihad supports the imposition of civil liability for at least
part of the huge damages that have been wrought.
Presently pending before a federal court in New York are several
consolidated multi-billion dollar lawsuits seeking, in part, to hold Saudi Arabia
accountable for its role in 9/11.142  To date these suits have failed.  This
litigation will be more fully described in Part III,143 but it suffices to say here
that procedural and jurisdictional hurdles limiting the use of American courts
for resolution of claims against foreign nations, principally, the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity, have proven formidable.  However, the plaintiffs’
choice of theories also burdens these suits.  Most litigants are pursuing theories
of liability resting only on Saudi Arabia’s funding of Islamic charities.144
Instead of focusing just on the money trail, we believe these litigants should
also focus on Saudi Arabia’s extraordinary and unstinting support of the key
ideological foundation of Islamic terrorism through its teaching of Sunni
Wahhabism.145  It was religion, not money, which ignited and sustains the
present and consuming terrorism.146
Saudi Arabia’s negligence liability is much like that of the benighted farmer
in the simple old case of Vaughan v. Menlove.147  In that case, the farmer’s
poorly constructed hayrick caught fire and burned down his own barn and then
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148. See, e.g., James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
negligence and products liability claims against video game manufacturer because student’s
conduct in killing three students at school was not reasonably foreseeable conduct to the
manufacturer, and no special relationship existed between the manufacturer and the deceased
students); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002) (dismissing
negligence and wrongful death claims against producer of violent video game on several
grounds, including that producer owed injured party no duty of care); McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,
249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that musical compositions which express the
view that suicide is acceptable are entitled to First Amendment protection and a listener’s
suicide from such musical compositions was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
distributing such music).  But see Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997)
(holding the act of publishing a manual detailing how to kill someone was actionable under
Maryland law); Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992)
(affirming award of punitive damages against magazine defendant for negligently publishing
an advertisement that created an unreasonable risk of solicitation of violent criminal activity);
Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (holding that it was foreseeable that a
broadcaster’s youthful listeners would race to find a prize, and in so doing, disregard demands
of highway safety); Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (remanding
negligence and intentional tort claims against producer of the movie Natural Born Killers and
announcing a two-part test to determine when speech should be restrained because it was an
incitement; (1) speech must be directed or intended toward the goal of producing imminent
lawless conduct and (2) such speech was likely to produce such imminent conduct).
his neighbor’s house.  The court ruled that the farmer’s freedom to do what he
wished on his own property was tempered by the duty not to negligently harm
his neighbors.  It was no defense that he might have been a little stupid or that
he built the best hayrick he knew how to build.  The farmer’s duty, the standard
of care he owed to his neighbor, was an objective one.  Would a person of
ordinary intelligence have built the same sorry hayrick?  If not, the farmer, even
if he intended no harm, must nevertheless pay for the harm his negligence
caused.
Like the farmer, Saudi Arabia must pay, not because it intentionally waged
war on the United States, but because its negligence ignited a jihadist fire that
harmed its neighbors.  If that fact can be proven, as Part I of this article argues,
then the law provides ample room in the negligence action for the imposition
of civil liability based on either or both of the following theories of liability.
A. Negligent Incitement
Our first theory of liability, based on training Saudi subjects to hate others,
appears closely related to many other cases in American law attempting to hold
the media liable for some outrage.  Cases such as those involving hearing
violent rock songs, reading bad books, seeing sadistic movies, and playing
bloody video games have all generally failed.148  These cases involved attempts
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149. See Rice, 128 F.3d 233; see also Braun, 968 F.2d 1110; Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d
1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding a retail book dealer was not liable under the UCC to
purchaser of cookbook for injuries and damages caused by improper instructions or lack of
adequate warnings as to poisonous ingredients used in recipe); Smith v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
599 A.2d 320 (R.I. 1991) (dismissing claims of negligence, products liability, and express and
implied warranties against brewer for advertisements because the plaintiff could not identify
specific advertisement he had seen and he could not reasonably rely on any representation in
media advertising that driving while intoxicated was safe or acceptable); Way v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App. 1993) (using a risk-utility analysis and holding that a
magazine publisher did not have a duty to not publish a firearms supplement or to add warnings
about danger of firearms and ammunition).
150. See Sakon v. PepsiCo, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a soft drink
manufacturer did not breach any duty by airing a television advertisement containing a
dangerous stunt simply because plaintiff subsequently attempted same stunt); see also Weirum,
539 P.2d 36. 
151. See Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., 25 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1705 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(granting motion for summary judgment on behalf of defendant artist and recording company
because the probability of harm arising from lyrics in a rap song is very low, while the burden
of preventing such harm is very high); see also McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187; Pahler v. Slayer,
No. CV 79356, 2001 WL 1736476 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2001) (barring plaintiff’s wrongful
death cause of action against music industry defendants because of principles of free speech,
duty, and foreseeability).
152. See Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989) (granting
summary judgment on First Amendment grounds to producer and distributor of movie which
did not overtly advocate or encourage unlawful or violent activity on part of viewers).
153. See James, 300 F.3d 683; see also Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167
(D. Conn. 2002) (dismissing products liability, filial loss of consortium, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims against manufacturer of “Mortal Kombat” video game
on several grounds, including First Amendment protection); Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264.
154. See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (prohibiting imposition
of liability on manufacturer of game based on content of the game because the First Amendment
extends protection to such materials even though they may offend the sensibilities of some
people); see also Pahler, 2001 WL 1736476 (barring plaintiff’s wrongful death cause of action
against music industry defendants because of principles of free speech, duty, and foreseeability);
DeFilippo v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (holding that a broadcast of a hanging
stunt did not constitute an incitement to produce harmful action in such a manner for the
broadcast to lose its First Amendment protection).
155. See James, 300 F.3d 683 (dismissing on grounds of negligence and products liability);
Sanders, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (dismissing because producer owed no duty of care); Smith v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 599 A.2d 320 (R.I. 1992) (dismissing claims of negligence, products
to hold media defendants, such as a publisher,149 broadcaster,150 musician,151
producer,152 and video-game manufacturer153 liable for physical injuries inflicted
by those who are allegedly inspired by the violent content they consume.  Some
of these cases were dismissed on First Amendment grounds.154  Others were
dismissed because the producer of the violent media was held not to have a duty
to prevent such harm or that the media message did not cause the harm.155
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liability, and express or implied warranty); Way v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.
App. 1993) (finding no duty on publisher using risk-utility).
156. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002). 
157. Id. at 1268 (citing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint).
158. The Sanders court’s determination that the media producers owed no legal duty to the
injured party was based on three factors: (1) the intentional violent conduct of the teenagers was
not foreseeable; (2) violence as expressed in art and entertainment has social utility; and (3) the
intrusion into First Amendment rights was an impermissible burden to place on the media
defendants.  Id. at 1271-75.
159. Id. at 1275-76.  The court also held that the media defendants were entitled to First
Amendment protection from liability.  Id. at 1280-82.




164. Professor David Anderson of the University of Texas has aptly named cases like
Sanders “media harm” cases.  See David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 957, 958 (2002).
165. See id. at 977-79 (discussing media harm cases that examine the question of
foreseeability).
A recent example of how these cases are lost on non-constitutional grounds
is found in Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc.156  In Sanders, the family of
a teacher killed in the Columbine High School shootings alleged that the
producers of violent media (video games and movies) were liable for the
teacher’s death in that “‘but for the actions of the . . . Defendants . . . the
multiple killings at Columbine High School would not have occurred.’”157  The
district court dismissed the claims, finding that the defendant media companies
owed no duty of care,158 and that the violent media could not have anticipated
that its games and movies would lead to the death of the teacher.159
The weakness of the Sanders case distinguishes it from an incitement claim
against Saudi Arabia.  First, regarding foreseeability, the Sanders court
explained that the media defendants “had no reason to suppose that Harris and
Klebold would decide to murder or injure their fellow classmates and
teachers.”160  The plaintiffs had alleged that “children who witness acts of
violence and/or who [are] interactively involved with creating violence or
violent images often act more violently themselves and sometimes recreate the
violence . . . .”161  The plaintiff’s vague sociological allegation of foreseeability
did not sustain their case.162  The court explained that at most “these Defendants
might have speculated that their motion picture or video games had the potential
to stimulate an idiosyncratic reaction in the mind of some disturbed individuals.
A speculative possibility, however, is not enough to create a legal duty.”163  A
number of analogous “media harm”164 cases have similarly held that a violent
response to violent media is not foreseeable.165 
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166. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
167. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 23, at 20-21.
168. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
But the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not just produce a rock song or violent
movie.  Saudi Arabia prohibited freedom of thought and religion and then
instilled, from birth, a loathsome vision of the infidel.  The country’s very
existence is inextricably linked with the effort to carry forward the hateful and
intolerant Wahhabist theology.  In that regard it has succeeded marvelously;
indeed, Saudi Arabia has infected the world.
Unlike the entertainment media at issue in Sanders, the inciting
communications and conduct in the case against Saudi Arabia is as different as
a flood from a summer shower.  The message from Saudi Arabia is not in the
incidental movie or video game.  A message condoning religious violence
pervades the life of a Saudi Wahhabist Muslim.166  Saudi children learn to hate
Jews and Christians from textbooks, Saudi adults are bombarded with the same
message in state-run media, and state-sponsored Saudi clerics not only preach,
but enforce this religious totalitarianism.  This is not the occasional movie, but
instead real and daily life for the Saudis.
The substance of the messages at issue is also very different.  Privately
produced and distributed entertainment, at issue in Sanders and the other media
harm cases, bears little resemblance to the Kingdom-produced and distributed
religious messages in the case against Saudi Arabia.  When the message at issue
is contained in commercial entertainment, the foreseeable response is that the
recipient, if he or she chooses to buy the entertainment, will be entertained but
take no real life action.  But when the violent message is instilled from birth by
powerful and persuasive state-sponsored religious pulpits, from the classroom
to the mosque, the religious speaker should not be surprised when some
recipient heeds the call and responds with violent action.167  Media is intended
to entertain.  Religion is intended to inspire faith and provoke action.  Unlike
the harm in the media cases, it is foreseeable that a constant religious message
condoning, and in some cases commanding, violence against Christians, Jews
or the secular West will result in religiously motivated violence.
Although many media cases are resistant to the imposition of liability, there
are some notable exceptions.  Consider the case of Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc.168  There the California Supreme Court held a radio station liable because
it was foreseeable that a teenage listener of a broadcaster’s audience would be
inspired to speed around town in search of a prize.  The case involved a contest
sponsored by the radio station.  Listeners were invited to tear around Los
Angeles in search of a popular disc jockey and claim a cash prize by being the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
254 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  60:223
169. Id. at 40.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 41.
172. Id.  This explanation is based on the classic distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance in tort.  Id.  Where liability is based solely on nonfeasance (i.e., failure to warn or
failure to control), then a duty will arise only if the plaintiff demonstrates a special relationship
exists between the defendant and either the injured party or the third-party tortfeasor.  Id.; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
173. See supra Part I.B.
first to locate him.  One listener, in a desperate attempt to claim the prize,
negligently ran another car off the road, killing the driver. 
The radio station piously claimed that it owed no duty of care to the injured
party.  It relied on two familiar common law rules.  First, the station argued that
“an actor is entitled to assume that others will not act negligently.”169  The court
held that the station’s reliance on this rule was misplaced because the rule was
valid “only to the extent the intervening conduct was not to be anticipated.”170
The key inquiry, according to the court, was the foreseeability that the station’s
broadcast would induce listeners to react in a hazardous manner.  Because the
radio station knew that its audience was young, of significant size, and very
likely to respond to a cash-giveaway contest, the station had a duty to exercise
reasonable care in its broadcast.
The radio station also argued that it owed no duty to the injured party
because it did not have a special protective relationship with the injured party
or the negligent listeners.  This argument was based on the general rule that
“absent a special relationship, an actor is under no duty to control the conduct
of third parties.”171  The court also rejected this argument and explained that the
special relationship rule “has no application if the plaintiff’s complaint, as here,
is grounded upon an affirmative act of [the] defendant which created an undue
risk of harm.”172  The radio station started the mess and they had to clean it up.
Like the plaintiffs in Weirum, we assert that the Saudi Government, by
affirmative acts of the most consistent and vigorous nature, created an undue,
indeed an absolutely stunning risk of harm through its indoctrination of
Wahhabist ideologies justifying and encouraging violence.173
Perhaps Saudi Arabia might have taken care that its propagation of
Wahhabist doctrine in Saudi Arabia did not result in harm to those outside
Saudi Arabia by shutting down the most incendiary of mullahs or changing the
school curriculum.  But the point here is not that Saudi Arabia is liable only for
its failure to control or mitigate the risk it created, but that it is liable because
it created the undue and foreseeable risk in the first place.  Incitement is enough
on its own to constitute a cause of action, and the Kingdom’s failure to reign in
its excited subjects is merely an independent breach of a separate duty of care.
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174. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
175. Id. at 251 (quoting Alleco Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 665 A.2d
1038, 1049 (Md. 1995)).
The farmer in Vaughan was held liable not because he failed to fight the fire,
but because he negligently started it.
Additional justification for imposing a duty to refrain from inciting violence
is found in the famous hit man cases.  In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,174 the
plaintiffs sued the publisher of the book Hit Man: A Technical Manual for
Independent Contractors, seeking compensation for the brutal murders of
plaintiffs’ family members carried out by a reader of the murder instruction
book.  The Fourth Circuit held that the act of publishing a how-to-kill manual
was actionable under Maryland law.  The court explained that under Maryland
law a defendant who “by any means (words, signs, or motions) encourages,
incites, aids or abets the act of the direct perpetrator of the tort” is jointly liable
for the perpetrator’s actions.175  How-to-kill manuals and why-to-kill sermons
have a great deal in common in that they both encourage, incite, aid or abet
another’s act of killing.  Why-to-kill sermons, however, are more dangerous in
that they provide a religious justification motivating others to take action.  The
how-to-kill manual on its own does not motivate anyone to take any action.  If
a publisher who does nothing but print the book about how to kill is held liable,
then surely a state that produces a culture based on why to kill should be held
liable.  Matched up against the comparatively innocent publisher, no tears
should be shed for Saudi Arabia if it is made to pay back to American victims
some of the petrodollars Americans pay to Saudi Arabia.
When Saudi Arabia authored textbooks teaching its children to hate Jews and
Christians, could it foresee potential harm?  When Saudi Arabia destroyed the
religious autonomy of its citizens by outlawing any religious belief or practice
other than Sunni Wahhabist Islam, could it foresee potential harm?  When
Saudi Arabia established mosques and madrassas in other parts of the world
propagating Sunni Wahhabist Islam and justifying violence in the name of
Islam, could it foresee any potential harm?
We believe that pleading these facts would support an incitement tort trial if
a United States district court were ever to have the courage to look with a
steady gaze towards the source of jihadist terrorism.  We realize that there are
difficult causation issues, perhaps impossibly difficult issues in tying the actions
of individuals to the culture of the state.  Only a tiny fraction of the Saudi
people ever act on the messages of violence, the bombers of 9/11 made a
deliberate choice to sacrifice their lives and murder thousands without any
coercion, and there was considerable time, space, and many contributing events
and voices that separated 9/11 from actions of the Saudi state.  We also
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176. 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (La. 1885) (holding that if the negligence of the defendant greatly
multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to the
accident, the possibility that the accident might have occurred with no negligence on behalf of
the defendant does not break the causation chain).  A corpulent, 250-pound woman was chasing
a train down a dimly lit stairwell when she slipped and fell.  The railway was negligent in not
providing enough light in the stairwell, but argued that their negligence was not the cause of the
corpulent woman’s injuries.  The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected this argument because the
lighting greatly multiplied the chances of injury to the plaintiff.  Id. at 696-98.
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 698.
179. Anderson, supra note 164, at 972.
180. See generally MCDERMOTT, supra note 2, at 100-01 (explaining the background of
Wahhabists).
181. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding the Constitution requires a federal rule that a public
acknowledge that a number of geopolitical concerns, such as the creation of the
State of Israel and the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia,
contributed to the ideological motivation of the 9/11 jihadists.  But the
undeniable fact is that, in the wise words of Reynolds v. Texas & Pacific
Railway Co., the actions of the Saudi Arabia “greatly multiplied” the chances
that harm would occur.176
In Reynolds, a very obese lady was rushing to catch a train with her loyal
retainers in tow down a negligently unlighted railroad stairway.  Of course she
falls and of course it will never be known why.177  She could have slipped for
many reasons, but the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that causation is a
mystery that often can only be considered in terms of chances.178  Professor
Anderson of the University of Texas makes the point that in media harm cases,
“Tort law generally allows causation to be inferred from evidence that the
defendant’s negligence increased the likelihood of the result, and juries can be
convinced in these cases that but for the publication, the [harm] would not have
happened.”179
The better view of causation is not to say with false certainty that “Saudi
Arabia caused the towers to fall” but to ask whether the towers would likely
still be standing if Saudi Arabia had not instilled Wahhabist beliefs in its loyal
subjects.  It is simply beyond cavil that the bombers were, to a man, committed
Sunni Wahhabists180 and that the fountainhead of Sunni Wahhabism springs
from the sands of Saudi Arabia.
One thing can be said with some certainty about Saudi civil liability.  The
Kingdom is not a citizen of the United States and does not in law enjoy, nor
should it enjoy, any special United States First Amendment constitutional
protection for its Wahhabist totalitarian program.  The American cases of media
liability are closely scrutinized due to the chilling effect of civil liability on civil
rights recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan.181  But Saudi Arabia enjoys no
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official cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves, with convincing clarity, the statement was made with actual malice).  The
“actual malice” standard placed a new hurdle in defamation litigation, because at common law,
truth was an absolute defense to defamation, and the burden was on the defendant to prove the
statements were not false.  After New York Times, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to show the
statements were made with “actual malice.”  See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
501 U.S. 496, 499 (1991) (noting that in order to prove defamation, the First Amendment
requires “a plaintiff to prove that the defamatory statements were made with what we have
called ‘actual malice,’ a term of art denoting deliberate or reckless falsification”).
182. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (holding that Libya, as a foreign nation, could not assert a constitutional defense to a civil
case brought by two American citizens in the United States).  Libya tried to assert a Fifth
Amendment Due Process defense against a civil suit brought by two American citizens who
were detained in Libya for distributing propaganda, and were subsequently beaten in jail.  In
denying Libya’s due process claim, the court gave three reasons why a foreign country is not
entitled to a constitutional defense.  First, a foreign sovereign is not a “person” within the
meaning of the Constitution.  Id. at 96.  A state of our own Union is not classified as a person
and is not entitled to raise a constitutional defense.  Id.; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966).  Accordingly, a foreign sovereign should not be considered a person that
is entitled to raise a constitutional defense.  Price, 294 F.3d at 96.  Second, the Price court
denied Libya’s due process defense because of the policy that a foreign state is external to our
constitution and federal system.  “[W]e think it would be highly incongruous to afford greater
Fifth Amendment rights to foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional system,
than are afforded to the states, who help make up the very fabric of that system.”  Id.  Finally,
federal precedent prohibited the court to allow Libya to assert a constitutional defense.  Because
the relationship between the United States and foreign sovereigns is usually based on
international law and comity, and because federal nations are external to the constitutional
compact of the United States, a foreign nation should not be allowed to assert a constitutional
defense.  Id. at 97-99.  
XXWe note that a case brought against Wahhabist clerics who are American citizens pursuant
to our indoctrination theory might implicate constitutional concerns.  For example, a case
against Muzammil Siddiqi, the Wahhabi cleric who recruited Adam Pearlman (a/k/a the
“American al Qaeda”), would likely implicate First Amendment issues not relevant to the case
against Saudi Arabia.  For an interesting account of Pearlman’s transformation from California
teenager to al Qaeda fighter, including the influence of Saudi-sponsored mosques in the United
States, see Schlussel, supra note 27.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
First Amendment protection.  While Saudi Arabia can destroy every civil
liberty it wishes inside its borders, our law is perfectly clear that Saudi Arabia
has no right to assert our individual American Constitutional rights in defense
of the harm it has inflicted upon Americans.182
B. Special Relationship Liability
A second basis for liability is found in the tort that has come to be known as
“special relationship” liability.183  The idea is that when someone has some
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causing physical harm to another unless:
XX(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or
XX(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Id.
184. Id.
185. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886, 886 (1934).
authority over a dangerous person, that authority must be exercised to keep the
other in check so that he does not harm a third party.  Thus, while a true
stranger can sit back and watch all the world go to hell, when a stranger forms
a “special relationship” with a potentially harmful person, that stranger is drawn
into a web of civic responsibilities and must take care to protect the innocent by
controlling the harmful person or by warning others of the danger.184 
In 1934, Professors Harper and Kime explained this special relationship
liability as follows: “If the conduct of the actor has brought him into a human
relationship with another, of such character that sound social policy requires
either some affirmative action or some precaution on his part to avoid harm, the
duty to act or take the precaution is imposed by law.”185
This second theory of liability looks back at the actions of Saudi Arabia and
asks whether it took the necessary steps to control the actions of its subjects or
properly warned the West.  Saudi Arabia’s establishment of a theocratic
monarchy mandating Sunni Wahhabism and forbidding any divergent religious
thought created a special relationship and imposes on Saudi Arabia special
governmental responsibilities.  Saudi Arabia, by its choice to control the
religious thought of its subjects, has assumed a duty to see that its subjects do
no harm in the name of their state-imposed religious beliefs.  Saudi Arabia’s
special relationship justifies a duty to control its subjects so that they do not act
out the violent message of the state or, at the very least, the duty to warn or take
other measures to protect the world from the subjects who are out of control.
Special relationship liability is based on Saudi Arabia’s failure to ameliorate the
risk of harm posed by those under its control.
The Saudi monarchy has forged with its subjects a bond that denies the
subjects any personal autonomy, religious choice, or individual freedom.  We
are not arguing that the relationship between government and citizen is a
relationship that often justifies a special governmental duty to control its
citizens.  But where the government exercises supreme authority over its
subjects, it assumes a special responsibility to use that authority to control the
violent tendencies that the government has inculcated.  The unique totalitarian
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186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965); see also Wade R. Habeeb,
Annotation, Parents’ Liability for Injury or Damage Intentionally Inflicted by a Minor Child,
54 A.L.R.3d § 10[a], at 974 (1973) (citing cases from numerous courts holding parents liable
for their negligent failure to prevent the tortious conduct of their children).
187. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979) (holding the relationship
between parent and child is a special relationship that gives rise to a duty of the parents to
prevent their child from harming third parties); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801
S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1990) (holding that generally there is no duty to control conduct of third
persons unless a special relationship exists, and that such a special relationship exists between
parent and child).
188. 529 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1995).  The child was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder, or ADHD, and the child was prescribed Dexedrine to help alleviate the
symptoms.  Id. at 596.  The child engaged in a variety of bad behavior, “including kicking,
biting, using vulgar language, fidgeting, and making inappropriate noises.”  Id.  His parents quit
giving the child Dexedrine after ten months of use, but failed to consult with a doctor or conduct
independent research to educate themselves on the effects of discontinuing Dexedrine.  Id. at
596-97.  The parents also failed to inform the school that the child was not taking Dexedrine.
Id. at 597.  With no medicine to help alleviate the external manifestations of his ADHD, the
child, in a fit of insubordination, lashed out at his special needs teacher, the plaintiff, and pulled
her hair so violently that she herniated a disc in her neck that subsequently required surgery.
Id. 
relationship between the Saudi monarchy and its subjects is a connection strong
enough to justify the imposition of “special relationship” liability.
A most realistic analogy of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and its
subjects is found in the law of parent and child.  Parents have authority over
their children and must exercise that authority in a reasonable manner so as to
protect innocent third parties.186  Numerous cases have forthrightly held that
parents owe an affirmative duty to third parties to prevent their children from
causing injury.187  These cases do not impose a vicarious liability such as that
between employer and employee.  These are not cases where Adam pays for the
sins of Cain by virtue of his fatherhood.  Instead, Adam pays because of his
personal failure to act to prevent harm in situations where a reasonable parent
would realize that his scion is a bloody menace.  This duty is justified because
parents are in a unique position to identify foreseeable harm and prevent its
occurrence.  Another common justification, also applicable in the case against
Saudi Arabia, is that recovery from the children for their torts is unlikely just
as recovery from Osama bin Laden for his torts is unlikely.
A good case demonstrating the potential civil liability for American parents
who fail to properly raise and control their children is seen in Nieuwendorp v.
American Family Insurance Co.,188 decided in 1995 by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.  There the court held the parents were under a duty to exercise
reasonable care in controlling their very troubled fourth grader who attacked his
teacher after being taken off his ADHD medication.  The parents were held to
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189. Id. at 598-99.  The court was guided by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316
(1965) (“A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as
to prevent it from intentionally harming others or from so conducting itself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (a) knows or has reason to know that he
has the ability to control his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control.”).
190. The test for causation in Wisconsin is whether a defendant’s negligence was a
substantial factor in producing the injury.  Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 630, 635
(Wis. 1980).
191. Nieuwendorp, 529 N.W.2d at 601.
192. See supra Part I.B.4; see also 2 DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004, S. Prt. 109-34, at 1967-69 (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter 2004
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT], available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/23016.pdf.
The report details how the Saudi government inspects Saudi subjects’ mail and maintains a
system of informants to report on “seditious ideas” spread by Saudi subjects.  Id. at 1967.  The
Saudi government maintains and enforces strict rules on who Saudi subjects can marry.  Id.  The
government also enforces “strict standards of social behavior” regarding when businesses can
operate, what clothing people can wear in public, and what public places men and women can
congregate together in.  Id. at 1968.  The government arrests non-married men and women
found in public together.  Id.  The government also bans all books and magazines “that it
consider[s] sexual or pornographic in nature” and either censors or flatly prohibits “public
artistic expression” and “public musical and theatrical performances.”  Id. at 1969.  Public
meetings are segregated by sex, and the government monitors “any large gatherings of persons.”
Id. 
have breached that duty by not informing themselves of the consequences of
discontinuing the child’s medication, not seeking information regarding
alternative forms of treatment for their child’s hyperactivity, and by not
informing the child’s school that the potentially violent child was no longer
taking the medicine.189  While the parents were said not to be negligent in their
decision to take the child off his medication, the parents were held liable for
failing to inform the school that he was Dexedrine free.  Additionally, they did
not talk about their decision with a doctor or research alternative forms of care
available to their child.  The court held that the parents’ negligence was a
substantial factor in the plaintiff-teacher’s injuries.190  The court based its
decision on the special relationship between a parent and child.  This
relationship requires reasonable parental care over their children in order to
keep their children from inflicting harm on others.191
As an intense theocratic monarchy, Saudi Arabia has quite intentionally
forged a parent-like relationship of control over its subjects.  The autonomy of
the subject, like that of a child, is severely impeded by the authority and control
of the Kingdom.192  It is difficult for the Western mind to grasp the intimacy
between the Saudi government and its subjects.  The King’s rule is complete
and his commands are supported by a council of religious clerics who give the
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193. See 2004 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 192, at 1963-79; see also Fuller &
Szayna, supra note 102, at 249-53.
194. See 2004 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 192, at 1967-69.
195. See Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So. 2d 1234, 1241 (Miss. 1999)
(discussing school system’s statutory duty to exercise reasonable care in controlling its
students).
196. 637 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1994).  The plaintiffs were sisters, and while one was waiting
on the other to get out of class, another student threatened to kill her.  Id. at 266.  The sister tried
to report this to the security office at school, but did not get any response.  Id. at 265.  The sister
did, however, inform an art teacher of the threat, but the art teacher took no action.  Id.
Subsequently, the student made good on her threat, hitting both sisters in the knee, head, and
hand with a hammer.  Id.
197. Id. at 266 (quoting Lawes v. Bd. of Educ., 213 N.E.2d 667, 668-69 (N.Y. 1965)).  The
court noted that “[t]he duty owed derives from the simple fact that a school, in assuming
physical custody and control over its students, effectively takes the place of parents and
guardians.”  Id.
198. Id.  Here, the school was put on constructive notice of the impending danger when the
student informed the art teacher about the threat.  Id. 
199. Id.
Saudi King’s commands the imprimatur of Islamic law.193  Unlike the
relationship between citizens of the United States and their government, a Saudi
subject’s daily life (social, religious, and personal) is heavily regulated by the
crown and cleric.194  We argue that this close relationship is akin to that found
between parent and child and should create a duty on the part of the Kingdom
to use reasonable care to prevent its agitated subjects from causing harm to
others.
Another analogous relationship creating a duty of care exists between
schools and pupils.  Many states have recognized that schools have a legal duty
to prevent schoolchildren under their supervision from causing harm to
others.195  This duty is based on the special relationship between the school and
the children it supervises and, thus, gives rise to a claim against the government
for its negligent failure to supervise children in its care. 
In Mirand v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals held that
schools have a duty to supervise their students and prevent them from taking a
hammer to each other when a threatened attack is brought to their attention.196
The court noted that schools are not insurers of safety, and “are not to be held
liable ‘for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure
another.’”197  But if the school had knowledge or notice of the “dangerous
conduct which caused injury,” the resulting injury is deemed to be
foreseeable.198  The court stated the test to be applied to determine the school’s
liability is “whether under all the circumstances the chain of events that
followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable
consequence of the situation created by the school’s negligence.”199
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200. 470 P.2d 360, 363 (Cal. 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Two students began
to “slap fight” after lunchtime, when the students were left unsupervised.  Id. at 362.  As a result
of the “slap fight,” a sixteen-year old student fell to the asphalt and cracked his skull, leading
to his subsequent death.  Id.  There was a teacher close by, but the teacher spent the entire lunch
period in his office not supervising any of the students.  Id. at 362-63. 
201. Id. at 363.
202. See, e.g., 2004 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 15, at 593 (explaining that the
government requires all public schools to give religious instruction related to Wahhabi Islam);
2003 STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT, supra note 67, at 542 (“The [Saudi Arabian] Government
follows the rigorously conservative and strict interpretation of the Salafi (often referred to as
‘Wahhabi’) school of the Sunni branch of Islam and discriminates against other branches of
Islam.  The Government limits the practice of all but the officially sanctioned version of Islam,
and prohibits the public practice of other religions.  Neither the Government nor society in
general accepts the concept of separation of religion and state, and such separation does not
exist.”); see also 2004 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 192, at 1970 (noting that Islamic
religious education is mandatory in all public schools).
203. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
204. Id. at 345.
205. Id. at 343.
The California Supreme Court has also imposed a duty on schools to prevent
schoolchildren under their supervision from causing harm to others.  In Dailey
v. Los Angeles Unified School District, the court imposed a duty on schools to
“supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to
enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection.”200  The court
held that either a total lack of supervision by the teachers, or ineffective
supervision, could constitute lack of ordinary care.201  The court did not allow
the teachers to escape liability when the teachers effectively turned their back
on their supervisory duties and refused to break up a fight on the playground.
Saudi Arabia has a relationship with its subjects much akin to that between
a school and its pupils.  Saudi Arabia serves as an educator while immersing the
citizenry of Saudi Arabia in Wahhabist Islam.202  As the relationship between
a school and its pupils gives rise to a legal duty imposed on the school to
prevent its schoolchildren from inflicting harm on others, so should Saudi
Arabia be held liable for not preventing its citizenry from inflicting harm on
American cities and American citizens.
The duty to prevent harm to others is famously illustrated in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California.203  In Tarasoff, the California Supreme
Court held that a psychotherapist had a duty to exercise reasonable care in
preventing a mentally unstable student from murdering, as he had promised to
do, the girl of his dreams.204  This duty rested on the foreseeability of harm to
the girl and a “special relation[ship]” between the psychotherapist and the
patient.205  The link between the patient and the therapist was a sufficient basis
for the imposition of a duty because:
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206. Id. at 347.
207. J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998).
208. Id. at 926.
209. Id. at 926-27.
210. Id. at 930.
211. Id. at 934.
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the
interdependence of its members.  In this risk-infested society we can
hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from
a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal.
If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the threatened victim
requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can
reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal
interest that would protect and justify concealment.206
If the relationship between a therapist and college out-patient is sufficient to
justify the imposition of a legal duty to restrain the patient or warn the intended
victim, then the relationship between the Saudi monarchy and its subjects is
most certainly sufficient.  If our judicial system cannot tolerate a psychiatrist’s
concealment of a danger learned via a confidential conference with a patient,
how can our system of justice tolerate Saudi Arabia’s knowing indoctrination
of a theology justifying the use of violence against those who disagree?
A final case is found in a recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court
that fits Saudi terrorism exceptionally well.207  In that case a husband molested
two neighborhood children in his barn.  The only thing his wife seems to have
known was that these prepubescent girls were visiting her husband and riding
horses with him daily.  When the molestation was discovered, a suit was
brought against the husband and wife.  Since the husband was in jail and
judgment-proof, the only way to obtain recovery was from the wife.208  
The claim against the wife was shockingly minimalist.  She was not claimed
to have aided, abetted, lured the girls or accommodated the molestation in any
way.  Instead the theory of the wife’s direct liability was that she should have
known or had reason to know that her husband might be abusing the neighbor’s
children.209 
The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the case to go to trial on this bare
allegation because of New Jersey’s strong public policy to protect children from
sexual abuse.210  The court demanded that the wife be alert to tale-tale signs of
abuse such as clothing left at the house or inappropriate remarks by the
husband.  If she had any reason to suspect molestation then she had a legal duty
to warn the parents of the children.211 
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212. See, e.g., Dore v. City of Fairbanks, 31 P.3d 788 (Alaska 2001) (holding that public
policy did not impose on police department a duty to protect third-parties where police failed
to execute an arrest warrant).
213. The public duty doctrine states that when a governmental entity owes a duty to the
public in general, it owes no duty at all to specific individuals.  See Suzanne M. Dardis, Note,
Gleason v. Peters: An Application of the Public Duty Rule as a Judicial Resurrection of
Sovereign Immunity, 43 S.D. L. REV. 706, 707 (1998).
If New Jersey’s wives may be held liable for failing to recognize tale-tale
signs that their husbands may be sexual predators on the basis of a strong social
policy against abuse of children, then the enormously important policy against
terrorism should require Saudi Arabia to be vigilant in recognizing, reporting,
and controlling the dangers posed by its Wahhabist-inspired nationals.
America’s interest in the avoidance of acts that harm America’s great cities
demands at least as much respect as New Jersey’s policy to prevent sex crimes.
We acknowledge that there are numerous authorities refusing to recognize
a governmental duty of care to prevent citizen wrongdoers from harming third-
parties.212  We are not saying that all governments are liable for the
wrongdoings of their citizens.  Governments are generally not vicariously liable
in an employer/employee sense, nor is the ordinary government under a civil
duty to prevent its citizens from harming others based on the government’s
relationship with its citizens.  Just as the government owes no general duty to
do the right thing and enforce its law,213 civil liability ordinarily does not attach
where the government only fails to control the conduct of its citizens.  Making
a tort out of an ordinary breakdown in law-enforcement is not only too
expensive for any state, it is also an arrogation of power from the democratic
and executive organs of government for courts to assume the duty of running
the police-power in America through civil lawsuits.
But we say again, Saudi Arabia is unique.  The Saudi monarchy has chosen
to carve out a very special relationship with its subjects.  The monarchy has
chosen to rule its people in a manner depriving them of independent thought or
action.  This is not a normal state where there is freedom of religion, expression
and thought.  Instead, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through its ruling clerics,
controls the life of its subjects.  With this degree of control comes the duty to
exercise it reasonably.
In sum, Saudi Arabia has sown a crop of dragon’s teeth and it must pay for
the harvest.
III. Is Saudi Arabia Immune from Suit?
Before proving any tort against Saudi Arabia, a significant, but
surmountable, procedural hurdle stands in the way: the doctrine of sovereign
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214. The concept of foreign sovereign immunity from suit was first recognized at common
law in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).  There, two
American citizens filed an admiralty action alleging that French soldiers acting under the orders
of Napoleon wrongfully seized and disposed of the Americans’ ship.  Id.  France was served
process but no answer was filed.  Id.  Instead, the United States Attorney General intervened
and argued that the case should be dismissed, asserting that France enjoyed immunity from suit
in United States courts.  Id.  The alleged acts of France, the United States argued, could only
be remedied through diplomatic negotiation, reprisals, or by a declaration of war.  Id. at 117-18.
Relying on “the law of nations,” the U.S. Attorney argued that relief for injury inflicted by a
foreign sovereign could only result from diplomatic negotiations and executive reprisals, not
judicial action.  Id. at 123.
XXJustice Marshall characterized the question presented as a “very delicate and important
inquiry” that called on the Court to determine whether and to what extent a citizen of the United
States could challenge France’s title to a vessel flying its colors entering an American port.  Id.
at 122, 135.  The Court thoughtfully held that there was no jurisdiction in the case because
France was entitled to immunity from suit in the courts of the United States given that France
was a co-equal sovereign power.  Id. at 136.  In dicta, Justice Marshall also expressed his doubt
that the actions of foreign sovereigns were ever appropriate for judicial review.  Id. at 145-46.
Justice Marshall explained that France did not waive its sovereign immunity by entering waters
controlled by the United States because:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended
to him.
Id. at 137.
XXIn the years following The Schooner Exchange, courts routinely dismissed suits filed against
foreign governments as a matter of course.  Courts began to struggle with such absolute
immunity as foreign governments became more involved with the daily life of American
citizens.  Over time the wall of absolute immunity began to erode.  A number of exceptions
developed in response to increasing contact between American citizens and foreign
governments.  See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Dep’t of Justice, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T OF STATE BULL.
984 (1952) (summarizing the erosion of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity).
XXAs these exceptions developed, confusion over the availability of immunity was a political
problem.  Courts began deferring to the recommendations of the United States Department of
State regarding the availability of immunity in particular cases.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at
8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.  Judicial deference to the Executive
Branch, in the words of the House Committee on the Judiciary, presented litigants with
“considerable uncertainty” as to whether a foreign state enjoyed immunity.  See id. at 9.
immunity from suit.  This section focuses on Saudi Arabia’s central defensive
strategy, its potential sovereign immunity.214
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215. Victims of 9/11 have filed several lawsuits against Saudi Arabia and members of the
Saudi royal family.  These cases have been consolidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003), and
cases cited therein.
216. The 9/11 plaintiffs seek recovery from two Saudi princes: Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz
Al-Saud, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General of Saudi
Arabia’s armed forces; and Prince Turki Al-Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Saudi Arabia’s
ambassador to the United Kingdom and former Director of Saudi Arabia’s Department of
General Intelligence.  In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 783-86
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
217.  See id. at 786 (“Plaintiffs claim that ‘[m]ore than any other factor, al Qaida’s
phenomenal growth and development into a sophisticated global terrorist network were made
possible by the massive financial, logistical and other support it received from the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, members of the Saudi Royal family, and prominent members of Saudi society.’”
(quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 398)).
218. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs’ Complaint ¶ 425). 
219. Id. at 789-804.
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2000).
221. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting that
A. Saudi Arabia’s Sovereign Immunity Claim
Saudi Arabia will undoubtedly assert its sovereign immunity from our
suggested “follow the theology” lawsuits just as it has done in the 9/11 “follow
the money” litigation currently pending in federal court in New York.215
Plaintiffs in the 9/11 litigation allege that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
members of the Saudi royal family216 provided “massive financial, logistical and
other support” to al Qaeda prior to 9/11.217  September 11, 2001, according to
these litigants, was a “direct, intended and foreseeable product of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia’s participation in al Qaida’s jihadist campaign.”218  Despite
these allegations, all claims against Saudi Arabia, and most claims against
members of the Saudi royal family, were summarily dismissed solely on the
basis of sovereign immunity.219  Saudi Arabia was not required to answer any
of the plaintiffs’ claims.
We believe that had the plaintiffs in the 9/11 litigation pled the theories of
“follow the theology” liability asserted in Part II of this article, they could have
overcome the hurdle of sovereign immunity.  Further, we also believe that the
federal judge too quickly dismissed the 9/11 litigants’ “follow the money”
claims on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The scope of Saudi Arabia’s sovereign immunity is limited by the “Torts
Exception” to sovereign immunity contained in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).220  Congress’ decision to subject foreign
governments to the original jurisdiction of federal courts where the torts of the
foreign government cause injury on American soil must be honored.221  The
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the Court “has deferred to the decisions of the political branches” with regard to foreign
sovereign immunity).
222. Argentine Repub. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433 (1989) (citing
Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845)).
223. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
224. The FSIA grant of immunity reads as follows:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party
at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604.
225. The limitations on immunity provided by the FSIA are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-
1607.
226. FSIA defines foreign states as follows:
XX(a) A “foreign state”, except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state as defined in subsection (b).
XX(b) An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” means any entity . . . 
XX(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, and
XX(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603.
Supreme Court has admonished all courts construing the FSIA to stay focused
on the primary objective: determining the scope of jurisdiction over foreign
governments “in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem
proper for the public good.”222  In other words, the core of the immunity
question is whether Congress intended for American citizens to have an avenue
for relief in American courts when Saudi Arabia’s tort caused the loss of life
and property in the United States.  In the context of the 9/11 litigation, did
Congress intend for Saudi Arabia to enjoy immunity from suits by U.S. citizens
claiming that the Kingdom funded or indoctrinated the terrorists?  The answer
to that question must be no.
B. The FSIA and Its Torts Exception
Historically, nations enjoyed almost absolute immunity from suit in foreign
courts.  However, the scope of sovereign immunity significantly eroded as
foreign governments became more closely connected with the affairs of private
citizens.  In 1976, Congress rejected the absolute view of immunity and defined
the scope of sovereign immunity in the FSIA.223  The FSIA codified the
common law that had developed around both the availability224 and limits225 of
immunity of foreign states in American courts.226  The FSIA provides the sole
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XXThe central purpose of the FSIA is to clearly define the cases where foreign states may assert
sovereign immunity.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.  Congress intended for the FSIA to be the sole basis
for immunity from suit.  See Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. at 434.  However, the FSIA
legislative history also explains that Congress did not intend to disturb the doctrine of
“diplomatic immunity.”  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.  The scope and extent of diplomatic immunity are beyond the
purpose of this article.
227. See Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. at 434 (“We think that the text and structure of
the FSIA demonstrate Congress’ intention that the FSIA be the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.”).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (lifting sovereign immunity for any country designated “a state
sponsor of terrorism”).
basis for jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in American courts.227
Critically, § 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA, commonly known as the “Torts
Exception,” knocks a gigantic hole in the wall of absolute sovereign immunity
by allowing citizen suits for torts that foreign countries commit causing injury
in the United States.  Section 1605(a)(5) lifts the sovereign immunity of foreign
sovereigns in all actions:
[I]n which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring
in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of
that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment; except
this paragraph shall not apply to —
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.228
This Torts Exception explicitly authorizes suits against foreign sovereigns
where their non-commercial torts cause injury to plaintiffs in the United States.
As described in Part II, Saudi Arabia has committed non-commercial torts
causing substantial injury to American citizens in the United States.
Accordingly, the FSIA’s Torts Exception provides a basis for federal court
jurisdiction in the ideology lawsuit proposed in this article and, we argue, over
the funding suits presently before the New York federal court.
Saudi Arabia’s immunity argument is based on three limitations to the FSIA
Torts Exception.  The first argued limitation is that because the FSIA now
contains an explicit State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception,229 all other claims
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230. Section 1605(a) provides that the Torts Exception is inapplicable to torts “based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
regardless of whether the discretion be abused.”  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).  Congress added the “State Sponsor of Terrorism
Exception” to the FSIA as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241-43.  The State Sponsor of
Terrorism Exception lifts sovereign immunity where:
[M]oney damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death
that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage,
hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in
section 2339A of title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state . . .
except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph — 
XX(A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under
section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 . . . or section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . . . at the time the act occurred . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).  This exception is only applicable if the Executive Branch designates
a foreign nation as a “state sponsor of terrorism.”  See id.; see also In re Terrorist Attacks on
Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that Congress made
a policy decision that the Executive Branch, and not the courts, have the authority to label a
foreign nation as a terrorist).  Clearly the State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception is an insufficient
basis for jurisdiction in the suit we propose because the Executive Branch has not designated
Saudi Arabia a state sponsor of terrorism.
related to terrorism are preempted unless authorized by the new exception.
Second, Saudi Arabia will argue that the Torts Exception does not apply to torts
committed, in part, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Finally, the Kingdom will argue that the discretionary function limitation
embedded in § 1605(a)(5) is applicable and preserves its immunity in this
case.230  Overcoming these arguments is the key to establishing federal court
tort jurisdiction in the lawsuit we propose.  We address each of these critical
arguments in turn.
1. Does the Torts Exception Apply in Tort Actions Based on Acts of
Terrorism?
This first argument rests on the relationship between the Torts Exception and
a corollary exception contained in § 1605(a)(7) commonly referred to as the
“State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception.”  The statutory question is whether the
enactment in 1996 of the “State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception”231 effectively
trumps the applicability of the Torts Exception in cases related to acts of
terrorism.  In other words, are the two exceptions mutually exclusive?
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232. See In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 794-95 (“Second, Defendants claim that
Plaintiffs impermissibly seek to contort a § 1605(a)(7) state sponsor of terrorism claims into a
§ 1605(a)(5) tort claim.”).
233. See id. at 796 (“[T]he court will not rule as a matter of law that subsections (a)(7) and




237. See id. at 796 (explaining that the State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception has been
interpreted to apply to situations where conduct occurring outside the United States causes
injury to U.S. citizens abroad).
Saudi Arabia raised this argument in the 9/11 litigation232 and District Judge
Casey rightly rejected it.233  Congress did not make the exceptions mutually
exclusive.234  Other provisions of the FSIA contain language that is clearly
mutually exclusive.235  “But when [Congress] drafted the state sponsor of terror
exception it did not include mutually exclusive language that would preclude
the application of the torts exception here.”236
The explicit language of the FSIA does not make the Torts Exception and the
State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception mutually exclusive.  But even when one
moves beyond the plain meaning of the words of the statute, it is clear that
Judge Casey’s conclusion on this issue is correct.  The two exceptions serve
entirely different pools of injured citizens.  The Torts Exception applies where
injury occurs in the United States.  The State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception
applies where injury occurs overseas.
Congress did not intend for the State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception to
displace the Torts Exception.  Rather, Congress intended this State Sponsor
exception to expand the availability of judicial relief when American citizens
are injured by foreign governments.  Prior to the addition of the State Sponsor
exception, American citizens injured abroad had no recourse against foreign
governments due to the geographic limitations in the Torts Exception.  The
State Sponsor exception filled that gap.  The Torts Exception still applies where
American citizens are injured in the United States.  These two exceptions work
hand in hand to accomplish Congress’ true intent — a judicial forum for
American citizens injured by the conduct of foreign governments wherever the
injury occurs.237 
It would be a strange result indeed to conclude that Congress, by enacting
legislation creating a new exception limiting the scope of sovereign immunity,
actually intended to expand the scope of immunity.  If Saudi Arabia commits
torts causing injury to American citizens, the Torts Exception applies on its own
terms without regard to the State Sponsor of Terrorism Exception.  The two
exceptions are not mutually exclusive.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss2/1
2007] TORT, TERRORISM & THE HOUSE OF SAUD 271
238. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2000).
239. 471 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
240. Id. at 790.
241. See id. 
242. 434 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Or. 2006). 
243. Id. at 952 (citing Olsen v. Gov’t of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1984)).
244. Id. at 953.
245. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
2. Does the Torts Exception Apply to Torts Occurring, in Part, Outside
the United States?
Saudi Arabia’s next argument is more challenging, but still surmountable.
The Torts Exception authorizes suits “in which money damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or
omission of that foreign state . . . .”238  Certainly what Saudi Arabia did, it did
on the sands of the desert Kingdom.  Courts interpreting the scope of this
“occurring in the United States” language have split regarding its applicability
where part of the actionable tortious conduct occurs outside of the United States
but the harm occurs inside the United States.
For example, in O’Bryan v. Holy See,239 Judge Heyburn determined that for
the Torts Exception to apply, “both the injury and the tortuous act or omission
must occur in the United States.”240  On this basis Judge Heyburn concluded
that the Torts Exception did not authorize suits against the Vatican for its
alleged tortious conduct occurring outside of the United States even though its
conduct caused injury to American citizens in the United States.241
In an analogous case involving the same foreign sovereign, another court
reached the opposite conclusion.  In Doe v. Holy See,242 Judge Mosman rejected
the argument that every part of an alleged tort must occur in the United States
in order to lift the veil of immunity.  Citing prior Ninth Circuit authority, this
district court concluded that “as long as plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to show
both the injury and the conduct (action or inaction) giving rise to the tort
occurred in the United States, the [torts] exception applies.”243  On this basis,
Judge Mosman concluded that the Torts Exception did lift immunity because
at least a portion of the Vatican’s alleged conduct caused injury in the United
States.244
These are not the only cases discussing the territorial scope of the Torts
Exception.  They are introduced to highlight the split of authority on the issue.
This split is the result of ambiguous dicta in a Supreme Court decision
discussing the Torts Exception.  In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp.,245 a case proving that strange facts result in confusing law, the
Supreme Court examined the relationship between the FSIA and the
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246. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
247. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. at 431.
248. Id. at 432.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 437-38.  As explained in the opinion, the Alien Tort Statue was passed by the first
Congress in 1789 to authorize original jurisdiction in federal court over “any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”  Id. at 436 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. Id. at 440-41.
253. Id. at 440.
254. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
jurisdictional provisions of the Alien Tort Statute.246  The Plaintiffs in the case
were two Liberian corporations affiliated with the American oil industry.247  A
shipping vessel owned by the plaintiffs, while navigating international waters,
was bombed by Argentinean warplanes.248  Consequentially, the plaintiffs were
forced to scuttle the vessel.249  The plaintiffs attempted to invoke the jurisdiction
of the federal court via the jurisdictional grant in the Alien Tort Statute.250  The
Court held that the FSIA effectively repealed the Alien Tort Statute and
provided the sole basis of jurisdiction over foreign governments in American
courts.251
The Court then went on to examine whether jurisdiction over the government
of Argentina was permitted by any of the FSIA exceptions.  The plaintiffs
attempted to invoke the Torts Exception by arguing that even though the
bombing took place on the high seas the injury to their vessel nevertheless
occurred “in the United States,” for purposes of § 1605(a)(5) because it
occurred within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.252  The Court
rejected this fanciful argument, finding the Torts Exception only applicable
when injury actually occurs in the United States, not just where its admiralty
writs might run.253
So far this case is unproblematic.  The acts of terrorism which are the focus
of our lawsuit caused injury in the United States.  But the Court, after
announcing its holding in Amerada Hess Shipping, continued, in dicta, to create
confusion regarding the scope of the Torts Exception.  The Court noted that:
[t]he result in this case is not altered by the fact that petitioner’s
alleged tort may have had effects in the United States. . . .
Congress’ decision to use explicit language [in other FSIA sections
regarding the effects of commercial conduct in the United States]
and not to do so in § 1605(a)(5), indicates that the exception in §
1605(a)(5) covers only torts occurring within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.254
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255. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
256. See Cabiri v. Gov’t of Repub. of Ghana, 165 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1999).
257. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 794-95 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
258. See id. at 795.
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2000).
Saudi Arabia will surely argue, relying on this statement, that the FSIA Torts
Exception only applies where the entire chain of actionable tortious conduct
occurs in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.255  And as explained
above, this argument has found currency in some of the circuits, including the
Second Circuit.256
In the current 9/11 litigation, Saudi Arabia argued the Torts Exception was
inapplicable because its alleged tortious conduct (funding Islamic
organizations) occurred outside the United States.257  The 9/11 court, to a
certain extent, sidestepped the argument by explaining that the actionable torts
in the case “[were] the attacks of September 11.”258  The plaintiffs had not
alleged that Saudi Arabia participated in the 9/11 attacks directly.  The 9/11
court offers up little legal analysis on this issue.
We argue that courts reading the Torts Exception to require every tortious act
and consequence to both occur in the United States are ignoring the plain
meaning of the statute.  The statute’s geographic limitation, by its very words,
is connected to the situs of the injury, not the defendant’s conduct.  The statute
allows recovery for “injury . . . occurring in the United States.”259
Furthermore, courts should not read the dicta in Amerada Hess Shipping to
substantially limit the scope of the Torts Exception.  There the Court, in light
of the facts of the case, was rightly concerned about foreign parties using
American courts to seek remedy from foreign sovereigns for injury occurring
many thousands of miles outside the territories of the United States.  The
Court’s dicta responded to the argument that the injury on international waters
occurred in the United States.  The Court was concerned about opening the
doors of the federal courthouse to foreign citizens injured anywhere in the
world’s international waters.  The Court was not considering whether Congress
intended the Torts Exception to lift immunity where American citizens are
injured or killed in the United States.  The Court’s dicta based on such a
distinguishable set of facts should not be read to limit the availability of the
Torts Exception to American citizens injured at home.
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260. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (2000).
261. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.  Specifically, the FTCA provides 
The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to — 
XX(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
Id. § 2860.
262. See Joseph v. Office of Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987).  “The
existence of a discretionary function [exception] under the FSIA is generally analyzed under
the principles developed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act's (‘FTCA’) discretionary
function exception.”  Id. at 1026; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 454 cmt. d (1987) (explaining that “[the FSIA torts exception] follows the corresponding
provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act”).
263. 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988).  Berkovitz involved an infant injured when he ingested
a dose of a drug previously licensed by the National Institutes of Health and approved by the
Food and Drug Administration.  Id. at 533.  The plaintiffs sought recovery from the United
States under the FTCA alleging that the license and approval were improperly granted.  Id.
264. Id. at 536-37 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Does the Discretionary Function Limitation Preserve Saudi Arabia’s
Immunity?
Saudi Arabia’s most potent challenge to the applicability of the Torts
Exception is found in § 1605(a)(5)(A).  There Congress preserved immunity in
“any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be
abused.”260  This statutory language was borrowed from the Federal Tort Claims
Act261 (FTCA) which allows and regulates suits against the United States.  Thus
it is to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FTCA that we must turn to find
the meaning of the discretionary function limitation in the FSIA.262
A unanimous Court in Berkovitz v. United States announced a two-pronged
test to determine whether the discretionary function bars suit: (1) Does the
actionable conduct involve an element of judgment or choice; and (2) If so, is
the judgment or choice “of the kind that the discretionary function exception
was designed to shield.”263  The Court also explained that application of this test
requires an understanding that while Congress intended to allow recovery for
tortious conduct, it also intended to “prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”264  The discretionary
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274. Id.; see also Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Interpretation of the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REV. 365, 371-72
(1995).
function limitation is irrelevant unless the challenged conduct “involves the
permissible exercise of policy judgment.”265
In United States v. Gaubert,266 the Court offered further guidance in the
application of the Berkovitz test.  Gaubert arose out of the savings and loan
crisis.  In the case, a shareholder of a defunct Texas savings and loan sought
over $100 million in damages from the United States on the basis of the alleged
negligence of federal regulators.267  The district court dismissed the case,
finding that all the alleged administrative negligent acts were discretionary and
thus barred by the FTCA.268  The Fifth Circuit, citing precedent pre-dating
Berkovitz, distinguished protected policy and planning level decisions from
operational level decisions.  The court of appeals reversed the lower court to the
extent that it had precluded operational level claims.269
The Court rejected the lower court’s distinction between operational level
and planning level decisions and reaffirmed the Berkovitz test.270  Governmental
decisionmaking, at any level, involving an element of judgment or choice is
shielded from judicial review so long as it is a decision rooted in considerations
of public policy.271  The Court went on to analyze whether the governmental
conduct was discretionary in light of the Berkovitz test.  The Court determined
that the governmental actions in the case were actions involving judgment or
choice because the governmental conduct was not “controlled by mandatory
statutes or regulations.”272  This provides some clarity in applying the first
prong of Berkovitz.  Courts are to determine whether the governmental action
is controlled by law.  If not, the act is discretionary.
Even if the acts are discretionary, courts must move on to the second inquiry:
whether the challenged discretionary act involves the type of policy judgment
that Congress intended to shield from judicial review.273  This step in the
Berkovitz analysis is critical to proper application of the discretionary function
limitation.  Gaubert explains that the second prong of the Berkovitz test is
intended to allow the efficient operation of the regulatory state by preventing
judicial review of agency decisions.274
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The point of this discussion is that the co-opting of the FTCA discretionary
function cases is not very helpful in determining whether the FSIA’s
discretionary function limitation should apply.  As Berkovitz and Gaubert
demonstrate, the concern in the FTCA is striking the proper balance between
an individual’s right to recovery and the federal government’s interest in
making decisions of public policy without judicial interference.  This is not the
balance Congress was attempting to make in the FSIA.  Congress was not
attempting to strike a balance between individual rights and the common good
in the FSIA.  Instead, Congress intended to protect American citizens from
injury while balancing the national interest in stable foreign relations.  Applying
the Berkovitz test to strike this balance is odd, to say the least.
Nevertheless, a court applying the Berkovitz framework in the lawsuit we
propose should conclude that its tortious acts were not the type of conduct the
discretionary function was designed to shield.  A decision to murder 3000
United States citizens at the World Trade Center, for example, is not a
discretionary act by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that Congress wished to
immunize.  And if we take Saudi Arabia at its word, that it did not intend to
harm America, that it is an ally, that it was shocked that most of the 9/11
jihadists were Saudis, then how can the bombing be considered any kind of
discretionary choice or act by Saudi Arabia, much less one that Congress
wished to immunize?
This is supported by cases interpreting the FSIA’s discretionary function
limitation.  For example, in Olsen v. Government of Mexico, a plane owned by
the Mexican government was flying some Americans back to the United States
for imprisonment pursuant to Mexico’s treaty obligations with the United
States.275  It was a stormy night and the pilots, after entering United States
airspace, tried to land by instrument with the assistance of San Diego-based air
controllers.276  The Mexican airport air controller equipment was broken, the
pilots did not speak English, they disregarded instructions to try another airport,
flew too low and hit a telephone pole, killing everyone on board.277  The Ninth
Circuit held that this conduct was not a discretionary act of Mexico, but was
instead the negligence of governmental agents carrying out the policy choice
of Mexico to have a prisoner exchange program with the United States
government.278
Although Olsen applied the planning versus operational level test
disapproved by Gaubert, the outcome is perfectly consistent with the idea that
the discretionary act exception does not apply to actions by government agents
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in derogation of the official policy of their government.  Mexico made no
policy level decision to crash its airplane into a San Diego telephone pole.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia made no decision to crash two airplanes into the twin
towers.  But in both instances, the negligence of the foreign government
damaged citizens of the United States and tort recovery is appropriate. 
Our conclusion that the FSIA’s discretionary function limitation is
inapplicable is further supported by a recent case analyzing a more arguable
discretionary setting.  In the Oregon Doe v. Holy See litigation,279 the plaintiff,
a victim of alleged sexual abuse committed by a Catholic priest, sought
recovery from the Holy See for its negligence.280  The Vatican claimed that it
was immune from suit on the basis of its foreign sovereign immunity.281  The
Vatican also claimed that its decision to relocate a priest was shielded from
review because it was a decision involving a high degree of judgment and
involving decisions rooted in the public policy of the Catholic Church — a
classic discretionary function of a foreign sovereign.282 
The Oregon district court, applying the Berkovitz two-prong test, rejected the
Vatican’s argument.  The court held that the decision to relocate a priest did
involve discretion and thus satisfied the first level of the inquiry.283  Moving on
to the second question, the court determined that “a sovereign’s failure to warn
of a known danger is not the type of policy-based decision the discretionary
function exception was designed to shield.”284  The court went on to explain that
where “the [foreign] government or agency is responsible for creating the
danger or exposing the public to a hazard that otherwise would not exist, the
failure to warn of the known danger is not the type of judgment the
discretionary function was designed to shield.”285 
Similarly, even if Saudi Arabia’s decisions to indoctrinate are discretionary,
its failure to control the danger it created is not the type of policy level decision
the discretionary function was designed to shield.  The court’s analysis in Doe
is instructive.  It takes a high level judgment and planning at the top levels of
the Vatican to move a priest from Ireland to the United States.  But that is not
where the discretionary function analysis ends.  The critical question is whether
the act or failure to act in the context of the specific allegations of the lawsuit
is the type of policy-based decision the discretionary function is designed to
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shield.  As the Doe court explains, “Failure to act after notice of illegal action
does not represent a choice based on plausible policy considerations.”286  Like
the Holy See, Saudi Arabia is “responsible for creating the danger or exposing
the public to a hazard that otherwise would not exist, and thus the failure to
warn of the known danger is not the type of judgment the discretionary function
was designed to shield.”287  It does not enjoy the protection offered by the
discretionary function limitation.
Once again, we take Saudi Arabia at its word that it did not choose to send
the 9/11 jihadists on their mission.  We claim only that the decision to inculcate
Wahhabism in its citizens without any restraints on how it would be propagated
nor any restraints placed on those who drank too deeply from the Salfist well
is simply negligence, not choice and above all not a discretionary act that
Congress wished to insulate from judicial inquiry.
Even if Saudi Arabia were now to confess that it desired the murder of the
9/11 victims, the discretionary function safe-harbor would still not apply.  In
Letelier v. Republic of Chile,288 one of the earliest cases to interpret the FSIA
Torts Exception, the court explained that whatever policy options may exist for
a foreign country, “there is no discretion to commit, or to have one’s officers
or agents commit, an illegal act.”289
The Letelier litigation arose from the assassination of Chilean ambassador
Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in Washington, D.C. on September 21,
1976.290  Plaintiffs in the wrongful death action alleged that the Chilean
government ordered its agents to commit the killings.291  Chile did not appear
in the action, but through the United States Department of State, Chile
informally informed the court that it contested the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign immunity.292  Chile denied involvement,
but argued that even if it had ordered the assassination, its actions were
decisions of a foreign government shielded by the FSIA.293  Chile argued that
Congress did not intend for the Torts Exception to immunity to apply to
“public” torts, but instead intended the Torts Exception to be limited only to
small time  “private” torts like auto-accidents and the like.294
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Despite the fact that Chile had not formally appeared in the action, the
district court carefully analyzed the FSIA and determined that it possessed
jurisdiction.295  One of Chile’s arguments was that the Torts Exception was
exceedingly narrow, demonstrated by several references to auto-accidents in the
FSIA’s legislative history.296  Applying a plain meaning construction of the
statute, the court rejected Chile’s argument: 
Nowhere is there an indication that the tortious acts to which the
[FSIA] makes reference are to only be those formerly classified as
“private,” thereby engrafting onto the statute, as the Republic of
Chile would have the Court do, the requirement that the character of
a given tortious act be judicially analyzed to determine whether it
was of the type heretofore denoted as jure gestionis or should be
classified as jure imperii.  Indeed, the other provisions of the Act
mandate that the Court not do so, for it is made clear that the Act
and the principles it sets forth in its specific provisions are
henceforth to govern all claims of sovereign immunity by foreign
states.297
The court then examined the discretionary function language.  The decision
to assassinate a public official was a policy level decision.  However, because
it was a decision to commit an illegal act, the court, citing cases interpreting the
FTCA, correctly determined that it was not the type of decision the FSIA’s
discretionary function provision was intended to protect.298  If Chile cannot
murder in Washington D.C., Saudi Arabia cannot murder in New York. 
This article is not intended to demonstrate that Saudi Arabia decided to harm
the United States, devised a plan to harm the United States, wanted to harm the
United States, or intended to harm the United States.  American tort law
requires actors who, without harmful intent, make mistakes that cause injury to
reimburse the injured.  It is on this ancient distinction between negligence and
intentional tort that our proposed “follow the ideology” case and the current
“follow the money” case against Saudi Arabia fit squarely within the FSIA’s
Torts Exception and should be preserved.  In both cases, negligence is the heart
of the action.
Congress wanted cases of negligent injury to Americans tried in United
States courts and that is why it passed the Torts Exception.  And that is why this
case should not be swept away by exaggerated notions of sovereign
“discretion” borrowed from American administrative law.  Ours is a theory of
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299. The “Commercial Activity Exception” to immunity is found in § 1605(a)(2) of the
FSIA:
A foreign state shall not be immune [in any case in which the action is based]
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000).
XXPlaintiffs in the 9/11 litigation argued that Saudi Arabia’s financial contributions to Islamic
charities known to support terrorist activities constituted a “commercial activity.”  See In re
Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11th, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  The court
disagreed, holding that the Commercial Activity Exception was inapplicable to the allegations
against Saudi Arabia and the Saudi princes.  Id.  The court noted that “for purposes of FSIA,
a commercial activity must be one in which a private person can engage lawfully.”  Id. (citing
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 360-62 (1993); Letelier v. Repub. of Chile, 748 F.2d 790,
797-98 (2d Cir. 1984)).  The court held that the alleged illegal money laundering did not
constitute a “commercial activity” as the term is used in the FSIA.  Id.
XXWhile the authors respectfully disagree with the district judge regarding his decision that the
provision of financial support does not constitute a commercial activity, this ruling does not
interfere with our central assertion that Saudi Arabia’s tortious conduct vests the court with
jurisdiction under the FSIA Torts Exception.
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303.  See Streicher Nuremberg Judgment, http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Streicher2.htm
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(last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
liability that falls well within FSIA’s invitation to bring tort suits seeking
recovery for injury occurring in the United States in federal court.299
Conclusion
On October 16, 1946, when Julius Streicher stood in front of the Nuremberg
hangman, his last words were “Heil Hitler.”300  True to the end, Streicher had
for twenty-two years published Der Stuermer (“The Storm”), which had vilified
every Jew as “a germ and a pest” and “a parasite.”301  “The Jew must die” was
a common refrain in his very popular speeches.302  The defeat of the Nazis
meant the trial of those who were most responsible for the war and the
Holocaust.  Though there was no evidence that publisher Streicher had ever
killed, harmed or participated in harming another person, he was indicted and
found guilty of acting in concert with those who murdered the Jews, a “Crime
Against Humanity.”303 
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304. See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League, Fueling Today’s Anti-Semitism: Demonizing Jews:
Anti-Semitism in the Saudi Media, http://www.adl.org/Anti_semitism/arab/saudi_blood_l.asp
(last visited Sept. 25, 2007) (quoting an article authored by a member of the Islamic Clerics
Association of Saudi Arabia published in a Saudi daily newspaper on September 6, 2002,
claiming that the Jewish festival of Purim is celebrated by the consumption of pastries made
with human blood).
For this holiday, the Jewish people must obtain human blood so that their clerics
can prepare the holiday pastries.  In other words, the practice cannot be carried out
as required if human blood is not spilled!!  
XXBefore I go into the details, I would like to clarify that the Jews' spilling
human blood to prepare pastry for their holidays is a well-established fact,
historically and legally, all throughout history.  This was one of the main reasons
for the persecution and exile that were their lot in Europe and Asia at various
times.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. A less dramatic example of the justice in holding responsible those who incite others
to crime was recently witnessed in New Jersey where the United States government successfully
prosecuted the ring leaders of an animal rights group, Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty (SHAC),
for inciting others to harass employees of a company.  Huntington Life Services (HLS) was
involved in animal testing.  SHAC’s crime was that “it posted and applauded acts of extreme
harassment, intimidation, vandalism and violence against HLS, its employees and others.”  See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Militant Animal Rights Activists Sentenced to
Between Four and Six Years in Prison (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
nj/press/files/pdffiles/shac0912rel.pdf. 
Streicher hung, not for what he did, but for what he said and taught.
Streicher’s hands had no blood on them, only ink.  Yet his hateful message was
judged by the rest of the world to be so serious that he deserved death.
Streicher’s rhetoric is hauntingly similar to that used in Saudi Arabia to
demonize “infidels” and Jews, including such sickening libels as accusing
Rabbis of “spilling” and consuming human blood on Jewish holidays, which
was recently published on the front page of a Saudi managed national
newspaper and written by a Saudi paid professor.304  If those who inspired
Fascist crimes against humanity can be hanged, then America can, with a clear
conscience, hold those who inspire Islamic crimes against humanity liable in
tort.305
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